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I. Introduction
I comment on the project of promoting heightened corporate attentiveness to human
rights compliance as an expert in corporate and securities law and novice in the field of in-
ternational human rights law.' The disparity sheds light on the difficulty of the project em-
braced in the United Nations Human Rights Council's reports on business and human
rights.2 To succeed, it must unite professionals from many different fields, including busi-
ness leaders, heads of nongovernmental organizations, politicians, human rights activists,
lawyers and academics. This multiplicity is reflected even within the academic community
itself, where the work of scholars of international law, human rights law, labor law, envi-
ronmental law, immigration law and corporate and securities law is all relevant. These
professional "factions" come to the enterprise with remarkably different priorities, metho-
dologies and ways of viewing the world.
Harvard Professor John Ruggie, as the U.N. Special Representative to the Secretary-
General ("SRSG") on Business and Human Rights-reporting to the Human Rights Coun-
cil-would have had a daunting task before him were it only to achieve consensus on busi-
nesses' responsibility to eschew human rights abuses. That his project has gone further-
has endeavored to create and operationalize a basic framework for promoting businesses'
attentiveness to human rights compliance and remediation-illuminates the project's dar-
ing. Were the real-world stakes not so high, Ruggie's and the Human Rights Council's ef-
forts would seem foolhardy.
I cannot speak of the schism that exists between senior business leaders and human
rights activists first hand.3 But it is easy to imagine the flash points in such conversations.
The SRSG consultation I attended in the fall of 2008 gave me a feeling for some of the va-
ried viewpoints and actors who have contributed to the annual reports beginning in 2005.4
But my own professional space is the academy. And within the academy, business law and
human rights scholars rarely cross paths.5 These are distinct scholarly communities sepa-
1. For my previous writing in the field, see Faith Stevelman, Globalization and Corporate Social Respon-
sibility, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 817 (2009).
2. For citations to any of the "famous" projects/working papers in the area, see Larry CatA Backer, On
the Evolutions of the United Nations' "Protect-Respect-Remedy" Project: The State, the Corporation and
Human Rights in a Global Governance Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 37 (2010).
3. Remarkably, the Ruggie information-gathering process has revealed widespread concern for human
rights compliance among business leaders. For data and citations, see U.N. Special Representative of
the Secretary-General, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights: Rep.
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter SRSG 2008 Report).
4. I attended the consultation in Boston in fall 2008 (sponsored by the Kennedy School of Government
and Oxfam) that addressed remedies and their appropriate fora. See Caroline Rees, SRSG Consultation
at Kennedy School of Government, Access to Remedies for Corporate Human Rights Impacts: Improv-
ing Non-Judicial Mechanisms (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.hks/harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/CSRI/publications/report_32_consultation report november_08.pdf [hereinafter SRSG Consul-
tation].
5. Scholars in international and human rights law have moved into the economic realm; business law
scholars have been slower to move in the other direction. For an example of the former, see, e.g., Ro-
bert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Beyond the Divide: The Covenant on Economic, Society and Cultural Rights
and the World Trade Organization, 30 OCCASIONAL PAPER (FES GENEVA) 1 (Apr. 2007).
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rated, with rare exception, by considerable mistrust and intellectual schisms.
In these past three decades, human rights internationalists have been deeply invested in
creating a viable legal tissue of global ordering, especially to reduce states' infliction of
harm. For human rights scholars, the opposite of law isn't "efficiency." It is discord, oppor-
tunism and force. As we know, Hobbes' "nasty, brutish and short" is a reality immediately
around the corner in many, many parts of the world, and corporations have not consistent-
ly been attentive to human rights and law-abidingness. 6 The incentives for corporate op-
portunism have been great; the sanctions-as applicable to global multinationals-less
impressive.
For corporate and securities law scholars, the counter-factual of law has been "efficien-
cy"-even "liberty"-from a neo-liberal vantage point.7 Put most simply, for the past three
decades, business law scholars have been preoccupied with streamlining law to reduce the
net costs they've imputed to it-costs they portray as friction on market transacting.8 Their
professional lives have been defined by the luxury, or fallacy, of taking basic law and order
for granted.9 For example, though remarkable, it appears to be true that Alan Greenspan
6. For an academic treatment of how the project of market development may often, unwittingly, spark
greater ethnic or national division, see AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET
DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003); and, for a more journalistic account,
see NAOMI KLEIN, THE SCHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM (2007).
7. Neo-liberalism is a controversial and loaded term but most simply it implies a reduction in state con-
trol to free up (even) market actors to seek their own individual good, in economic terms, as a form of
freedom. For a critical reading of the neo-liberal tradition and a contemplation of its plausible impact
on the global financial crisis, see, e.g., Jos6 Gabriel Palma, The Revenge of the Market on the Renders:
Why Neo-Liberal Reports of the End of History Turned Out to Be Premature, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 4,
829-69 (July 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433955 or doi:10.1093/cje/bepO37.
8. For an account of the deregulation of the financial services sector in this period, see SIMON JOHNSON &
JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010). For
one of the seminal treatments of law and economics thinking in the corporate law area, see FRANK
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
9. It is not a simple matter to ascertain the extent of the law abidingness or persistent law breaking by
major corporations and financial firms. Rigorous statistical studies have been hampered by inade-
quate data. Nevertheless, the combination of the accounting scandals that began the decade, the
mortgage lending fiascos and financial firms' seeming reckless disregard for common sense after they
accomplished massive deregulation present a discouraging picture. And more bad news appears on
the horizon in this sector. See e.g., Jean Eaglesham, US Sets 50 Bank Probes, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov.
17, 2010, at Al ("The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. is conducting about 50 criminal investigations
of former executives, directors and employees of U.S. banks that have failed since the start of the fi-
nancial crisis."). Furthermore, on Friday evening, November 19, the Wall Street Journal's website re-
vealed, for the first time, the existence of a massive insider trading case amassed by the government
Federal authorities, capping a three-year investigation, are preparing insider-trading charges that
could ensnare consultants, investment bankers, hedge-fund and mutual-fund traders, and analysts
across the nation, according to people familiar with the matter.
The criminal and civil probes, which authorities say could eclipse the impact on the financial indus-
try of any previous such investigation, are examining whether multiple insider-trading rings reaped
illegal profits totaling tens of millions of dollars, the people say.
Susan Pulliam, Michael Rothfeld, Jenny Strasburg & Gregory Zuckerman, U.S. in Vast Insider Trad-
ing Probe, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 20, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240S2748704170404575624831742191288.html. All of
this raises the question of whether massive financial frauds constitute any form of "human rights
abuse." On the view that human beings have a right to live in a community wherein the rich (firms
and individuals) are constrained from preying on the rest, at least this author would answer the ques-
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questioned aloud the need for legal prohibitions on fraud.10
Hence principles-based and methodological silos have delimited the professional dis-
courses of business versus human rights law, keeping them distinct from each other and
more immune to critique. Consequently, the view one takes of Professor Ruggie's "Protect,
Respect, Remedy" (PRR) framework, as detailed in the 2008 Report to the Human Rights
Council is likely to be contingent on one's starting point-the profits-markets-efficiency
camp or the rights-governance-vulnerability one.
The basic working premise outlined in the 2008 Report is simple, at least on its face.
States have a duty to protect their citizens from human rights abuses. Businesses have a
duty to respect human rights. Both governments and corporations have duties to work in
tandem to establish or strengthen and expand remedial frameworks for hearing human
rights grievances against corporations. The PRR framework is innovative and ambitious.
Only if we naively imagined a politically stable, culturally simpatico "flat-world" of market
transacting might we dismiss the brave beliefs inherent in what Ruggie and his cohort have
produced. Although impossible to predict the scope of their practical success, the PRR
framework is undoubtedly clear, savvy and thoughtful-indeed more thoughtful than its
simple surface suggests (as explained below).
When it comes to the outcome of human rights efforts, of course, little can be predicted.
Nothing within punditry or scholarship enables us to predict the evanescent windows of
opportunity for social and legal change. And yet we know that progressive social and legal
change does occur. For example, it is easy to forget that the word "genocide" was coined
only in 1943 by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer and linguist of Jewish descent. (Lemkin
himself narrowly escaped the Holocaust in Europe and lost forty-nine relatives therein-
his own life illuminates the contingency of social and legal change.)" Just such bold ad-
vance of principles and practices (and ultimately laws) is precisely what the PRR frame-
work contemplates for the business and human rights area. And the timing of the Ruggie
reports, as they span both the heyday and disasters of twenty-first century market neo-
liberalism, is tantalizing.
For a dozen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in what was described as a one "super-
power," "end of history" world, such a self-sustaining, globally prosperous market was im-
agined.12 But twenty years later, amidst the harshest global economic downturn since the
tion in the affirmative.
10. In a fascinating story first printed in Stanford Magazine, former head of the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission Brooksley E. Born recounts her 1996 lunch with Alan Greenspan during which he
told her," 'Well, you probably will always believe there should be laws against fraud, and I don't think
there is any need for a law against fraud,' she recalls. Greenspan, Born says, believed the market
would take care of itself." See Rick Schmitt, Prophet and Loss, STANFORD MAG., 2009,
http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2009/marapr/features/bom.html.
11. For discussion of Lemkin's work and his legacy in the development of international laws against
atrocities, see, e.g., David Luban, A Theory ofCrimesAgainst Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 85 (2004).
12. Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law (Yale Law Sch., Work-
ing Paper No. 235; New York Univ., Working Paper No. 013; Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No.
280; Yale Sch. of Mgmt, Working Paper No. ICF - 00-09), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=204528; see also LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL MORALITY
IN A ONE SUPERPOWER WORLD (1996).
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Great Depression, it no longer can be.' 3 Russia's slide into plutocracy provides one cautio-
nary tale of what goes wrong with too little law and justice.14 The festering problems cata-
lyzed by the Washington consensus, as they have played out in the southern cone of Latin
America for example, provide another.'s China presents a unique conundrum in its admix-
ture of law, authoritarianism and capitalism. And the rise of radical Islam-with its anta-
gonism towards liberal, democratic, capitalist practices-has altered the legal and geopo-
litical landscape in almost every respect.16 Here in the United States, Americans are
profoundly disappointed by corporate capitalism and by the government; neither seems to
have fulfilled its promises. As these examples and the writings of Robert Gilpin illuminate,
the understanding of global economic phenomena cannot be divorced from the study of in-
ternational politics, including the results of regional and religious conflicts and human
rights claims.' 7 In just this far-sighted vein, both the PRR framework and Backer's critique
situate firms and markets in broader geo-political structures: legal and political, as well as
moral and cultural. Neither firms nor markets can flourish apart from them. (This is what
makes China's experiment in authoritarian capitalism so fascinating to watch, of course.)
Nevertheless, the accelerated pace of international trade and financial deal-making, as
the Ruggie reports affirm, has created gaps in governance that demand new approaches
and responses. In the short term, corporations will be able to paper over conflicts and dis-
connects between their profit-maximizing objectives and human rights tenets. But the
enormity of the looming problems and challenges (the exigencies of looming climate
change, global pandemics, threats of terrorism, as well as widely vocalized, surprisingly
commonly held aspirations for justice) suggests that a global public is organizing to de-
mand something better than a superficial, short term fix when it comes to business and
human rights. Corporations that ignore this demand are likely to be threatened at the bot-
tom line. And most likely sooner rather than later.' 8 The failed states and failed markets
enumerated above are exemplars of this truth: At least over a reasonable time horizon,
law-including human rights law-is a natural complement to the market and not its ene-
my.
As the 2008 Report states, corporations will not thrive, over the longer term, where
governments ignore or facilitate legal vacuums. Without reasonable regulations and credi-
ble legal enforcement (through the private or public sector), businesses have little oppor-
tunity to avoid the "race to the bottom." They have no room to pursue both profit and "add-
13. For the argument that the current mess is appropriately denominated a depression rather than a re-
cession, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 210-45 (2010).
14. For a superb treatment of the reasons (securities) law matters and how, see Robert B. Ahdieh, Making
Markets: Network Effects & the Role of Law in the Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L.
REv. 277 (2003).
15. There is a vast literature on the shortfalls of globalization. See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND
ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); see also SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998).
16. For a treatment of this issue, see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law:
Enron Financial Fraud and September 11, 2001,76 TUL. L. REV. 1579 (2002).
17. ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2001)
18. MAx WEBER ET AL., ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Geunther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978)
(1900) (presenting the finest treatment of the place of market (economic) institutions within the
broader scheme of social institutions).
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ed capacity," such as safety in the workplace and honest consumer and investor relations.
In the absence of greater human rights coherence and global governance, international
trade and finance are expanding, but the emerging picture isn't as attractive as the World
Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO) and the academic vanguard of laissez faire had
proposed. Instead we observe a rough and tumble of realpolitik, national and regional ex-
igency, high stakes-high risk, and highly opaque financial transacting-all transpiring
against a backdrop of increasingly complex and uncertain macroeconomic and geopolitical
effects.19 If the global economic crisis illustrates anything, it's that the project of construct-
ing international superstructures of governance-governance spanning the realms of poli-
tics and economics/finance-cannot be delayed without inflicting incalculable social wel-
fare loss across the planet. The global economic crisis has written a new chapter in the tale
of globalization.
Indeed, there is consensus that the contemporary dynamics of globalization are
unique-qualitatively different than earlier ones.20 Humans have been "globalizers" since
before they were "human." To be sure; recent studies in paleo-anthropology suggest that
Homo Erectus meandered out of Africa behind the animals who foraged the grasses, ad-
vancing through Asia and Europe. The Chinese, of course, were fantastic early traders, as
their thousands of years of cultural achievements display. And in the early modern West,
that is European Renaissance, progress in the sciences, arts, law and letters was spurred by
advances in banking, finance and trade (over land and sea).21
Of course, it's modern technology that has occasioned the seismic effects of the current
wave of globalization. With global satellites, personal computing and inexpensive, nearly
universal cell phone access, information and communications technology has revolutio-
nized how business is conducted, enabling nearly instantaneous gathering, synthesis and
responses to operations and financial data-across the entire Earth's geography and time
zones.2 2 While cheap air travel has facilitated the ability of multinationals to move people
and cargo across the world, gaps in governance have allowed them to accomplish this
without internalizing the full environmental cost of their conduct.
A further crucial piece of this technological revolution is commonly overlooked: The in-
vention of the global corporation itself. The highly leveraged, widely (and largely anony-
mously) owned, professionally managed, structurally byzantine, limited liability corpora-
tion is the result of ongoing twentieth century legal transformation. And its "invention" is
more historically contingent than we commonly acknowledge. The invention of this kind of
corporation is a story of legal invention (affirmative rule-making) and legal destruction
(i.e., systematic deregulation). Legal invention is recognizable, for example, in the global
recognition of the corporation as a robustly capable, distinct legal person, an individual
19. For example, we see increasingly dramatic signs of climate change across the globe, as exemplified by
a rise in large-scale natural disasters and widespread fatalities; and yet we are at a moment of hope in
relation to Palistinian-Israeli peace talks.
20. ROBERT GILPIN, THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM: THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2000).
21. RICHARD A. GOLDTHWAITE, BANKS, PALACES & ENTREPRENEURS IN RENAISSANCE FLORENCE (1995).
22. For discussion see, e.g., id.; see also Eric E. Schmidt, Truth or Consequences, FORBES MAG. (Aug. 12,
2010), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0830/opinions-technology-eric-schmidt-google-on-
my-mind.html.
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possessing distinct rights, if lesser duties. The legal "person" is recognized as possessing
immortality in time and unbounded power in the geographic scope of its operations as a
result of accepted law. And its rights under the United States constitution are expanding.23
An early example of deregulation is the elimination of the many stakeholder-regarding
proscriptions which inhered in the early twentieth century incorporation codes. Such de-
regulation of corporate power encouraged corporate capital investment, hence industriali-
zation, and then the transition to an awesomely complex post-industrial, service econo-
my.24 The surface simplicity of corporate law (especially the codes, which govern the
process of creating a corporation), in conjunction with the durability of the corporate form,
encouraged the establishment of corporations, ones "preloaded" with all powers requisite
to conducting any lawful business. Indeed, it's easy to miss that most financial institutions
(including almost all the "shadow banking industry") and many previously "governmental
functions" (including the operation of war-related services, for example) have migrated to
the corporate form on account of the durability, anonymity and global capital-raising ad-
vantages it confers. If one contrasts the easy formation, surface simplicity and muscularity
of the corporate form with, for example, the fragility of wills and trusts, the indeterminacy
(legally speaking) of "the family," and the cumbersome caveats attendant to the con-
veyance of real property, the success of the modern "corporate legal technology" comes in-
to view.
My task is to comment on the excellent article of Larry Cata Backer, as it provides an
analysis of the 2008 Report's "Protect, Respect, Remedy" (PRR) framework.25 Ruggie's
most recent efforts, reflected in the 2010 Report, are directed at operationalizing the PRR
framework set forth in the 2008 Report. Both these reports have been vetted international-
ly amongst governments, lawyers, academics and human rights advocates. 26 How will gov-
ernments, corporations, trade associations and rights advocates conceptualize and con-
struct the fora and modes of recourse available to persons aggrieving human rights
abuses? 27 That question is the central focus of the 2010 Report and, as such, lies beyond
23. Citizens United v. FEC, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
24. For discussion of the transition from the pattern of legislative chartering and proscriptive regulation
of the corporate form to the far more "deregulatory" pattern of incorporating via simple filings under
statutes which freely grant corporate powers and impose very few restrictions, see Faith Stevelman,
Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57,
66-74 (2009) (discussing Delaware's interest in holding onto the firms chartered there). See also
Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Choice of Forum and Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law, 32 J.
CORP. L. 33 (2006) (discussing the internal affairs doctrine, its origins and its effect upon state compe-
tition for incorporation).
25. Backer, supra note 2.
26. Ruggie so describes the vetting of the SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 3, therein; Fried Frank L.L.P. has
produced a memo/survey that describes further vetting. Memorandum from Fried, Frank Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson L.L.P., to the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights (Dec.
2007), http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/Fried-Frank-Memo-Dec-2007.pdf. For the
most recent report by SRSG John Ruggie, see Business and Human Rights: Further Steps toward the
Operationalization of the "Protect, Respect, Remedy" Framework (Apr. 9, 2010),
http:/198.170.85.29/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf.
27. This was the precise subject of the fall 2008 consultation with the SRSG which I attended, as spon-
sored by the Kennedy School of Government in conjunction with Oxfam American at the Boston offic-
es of Foley & Hoag, L.L.P. See SRSG Consultation, supra note 4.
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my current charge here.
My comments are not intended to be comprehensive. I first provide a brief restatement
of the 2008 Report, and then in Part III comment upon Backer's discussion and analysis of
it. In Part IV I engage some additional questions and themes presented by the 2008 PRR
framework. In Part V, I turn overtly to describing and analyzing the relationship between
business and human rights questions and recent developments in American corporate law.
Part VI addresses how the agenda of business and human rights relates to certain recent
developments in federal securities law. In the conclusion I contemplate the curious rela-
tionship between legal change and social change. Professor Backer is certainly correct that
the PRR framework will be influential in the evolving relationship of business and human
rights. The rest remains to be resolved through a complicated conversation, between busi-
ness leaders, human rights advocates and lawyers and politicians, for years to come.
II. Overview: The PRR Framework of the 2008 Report
There were reports prior to 2008,28 and there have been ones since, so why do commen-
tators focus on Ruggie's 2008 Report? The answer is that the 2008 Report lays out the core
principles of the Human Rights Council's initiative in promoting adherence to human rights
by international businesses. The 2008 Report refers to itself as a "conceptual and policy"
framework for business and human rights, and its central message is captured in the
phrase: "Protect, Respect, Remedy." States must "protect" against human rights abuses.
Corporations must respect human rights in all their operations, those of their affiliates and
suppliers. Both must work towards remediation, and compensation, where appropriate.
The Ruggie reports follow the spectacular descent into oblivion of the UN Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Re-
gard to Human Rights ("Norms"). 29 The Norms were released in 2003-and by 2004 they
had been roundly rejected by international commentators. Professor Ruggie, a highly ac-
complished political scientist, was himself one of the most outspoken detractors from the
Norms. 30 The Norms' failed approach was to enunciate a core set of international human
rights standards that businesses would be immediately responsible for protecting. For the
Norms' critics, these rights were catastrophically under-inclusive. Moreover, they con-
tended, the allocation of primary and secondary responsibility for human rights com-
pliance, as between states and businesses in various contexts, was incoherent and would
28. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises Reports, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, ,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/TransnationalCorporations/Pages/SRSGTransCorpindex.aspx
(last visited June 15, 2011).
29 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Subcomm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights,
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Busi-
ness Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (August 26,
2003).
30. For a listing of John Ruggie's credentials, scholarship and professional accomplishments, see John
Ruggie-Biography, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/johnruggie/bio.html.
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produce unproductive, harmful confusion and dissension. Following the Norms' failure to
garner adherents, in 2005 Professor Ruggie was appointed the "Special Representative on
business and human rights," reporting to the Secretary-General and the Council. His five-
year term was extended for an additional five years in 2010.31
The 2008 Report begins with an extensive discussion of states' duty to protect citizens
from human rights violations, whether committed by individuals or corporations. Most
germanely, the Report describes states' responsibility for using law to promote human
rights respecting corporate cultures. The Report notes states' shortfalls in "vertical cohe-
rence"-that governments have paid lip service to corporations' human rights obligations
while failing to establish effective mechanisms for the redress of human rights grievances
against corporations. The Report also notes shortfalls in the "horizontal coherence" of
states' policies towards business and human rights; that is, that states have ignored or faci-
litated gaps between governmental bodies tasked with human rights responsibilities and
others empowered to advance commercial and investment goals.
Another highly important discussion encompassed within the 2008 Report relates to
business investment treaties (BITs). Too often, host states have been so needful of financ-
ing and assistance in project development that they have agreed to halt social welfare
regulation during the pendency of such a project of financing (or to pay damages if they do
enact such regulations). These BITs have thus too often stymied host governments from
enacting new regulations essential to social welfare. Indeed, in a given country, such a pri-
vately enforced "hiatus" in social welfare regulation may persist for decades. As a field of
study and policy inquiry, BITs and their net effects on host country citizens' social welfare
has largely fallen into the chasm of the business and human rights divide described above.
Nor are BITs, even, a central focus of the Ruggie reports. As is true of the 2008 Report,
these are largely aimed at multinational operating companies and the human rights exter-
nalities which foreseeably arise from their conduct in conditions of weak rule of law.32
The central, organizing question of the 2008 Report is: "How to improve human rights
compliance by individual businesses?" According to the 2008 Report, the first crucial miss-
ing factor is the absence of a coherent "conceptual and policy" framework. This is where
the PRR framework is aimed-at filling just this void. As resolved therein, corporations
have a duty to respect human rights-in essence, a duty to "do no harm" to citizens' human
rights. At face value, the duty is a passive one, but this is misleading. To accomplish this
negative injunction, definitive, affirmative actions by corporate executives (and their law-
yers) are required.
Just so, the 2008 Report describes myriad intra-corporate initiatives that will contribute
to corporations' avoiding complicity in human rights abuses. For example, it uses the no-
tion of "corporate culture" to invoke corporate executives' responsibilities to inspire the
31. For a superb overview of the United Nations Human Rights treaties dating back decades and leading
up to the Ruggie reports, see Global Efforts to Hold Corporations Accountable: Past Efforts and Current
Initiatives, 12 INT'L REV. NEWSL. 16 (Ctr. for Int'l L. at N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), Fall 2009.
32. For a sober (i.e., relatively nonpartisan) account of the investment treaty process and structure, see
Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States,
104 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (2010).
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observance of human rights. As stated therein, senior corporate executives should be vigi-
lant in overseeing the establishment of systematic compliance codes, the dissemination of
such codes, other corporate education protocols, internal reporting systems attuned to
human rights compliance, and the creation of effective, accessible modes of processing
rights complaints. As another example of this proactive approach, the 2008 Report advises
that corporations should undertake human rights impact studies before they formalize in-
vestment contracts and commence development projects. The 2008 Report also encom-
passes an expanded discussion of human rights "due diligence" and its role in avoiding
corporations' complicity with abuses. The 2008 Report suggests that by taking such steps,
executives can enable their corporations to "respect" human rights and reduce their firms'
chances of being complicit in human rights abuses.
Another achievement of the 2008 Report is its cataloguing of earlier and ongoing busi-
ness and human rights studies, guidelines, codes and other initiatives. As becomes evident
from the 2008 Report, the United Nations' effort in generating these reports, and its com-
mitment to the business and human rights agenda, is larger than the sum of any individual
report. As described therein, the 2008 Report is the culmination of fourteen multi-
stakeholder consultations on five continents; the undertaking of more than two dozen re-
search projects assisted by global law firms and other legal experts; the amassing of 1000
pages of documents and twenty "submissions," including previous reports both to the
Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council.3 3
The astounding accumulation of studies, initiatives, guides to best practice and business
and human rights compliance codes bubbling up from the international business and activ-
ist communities is a revelation. These include the Equator Principles, 34 the Paris Prin-
ciples,35 a multitude of multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Kimberly Process, 36 the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 37 the Tripartite Declaration of Principles
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,38 the Global Compact,39 and the
ongoing efforts of the International Labor Organization. 40 Situating the 2008 Report in this
context, it's plain that there is a mounting crescendo of demand and desire to avoid human
rights abuses by corporations.
33. "All documentation produced by and for the mandate is posted on the Business and Human Rights
Resource Centre's website." SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 3, 1 3 n.1; UN Special Representative on
Business & Human Rights, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Home (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
34. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com (last visited Feb. 4,2011).
35. The Paris Principles, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/parisprinciples.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
36. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/home/indexen.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2011)
37. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational En-
terprises (2008), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
38. International Labor Office, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy (Third Edition) (2001), http://www.ilo.int/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed-emp/---
emp-ent/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf.
39. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompactorg/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
40. Programmes and Projects, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/global/programmes-and-projects/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb 4, 2011).
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On the issue of remedies, the 2008 Report surveys the strengths and weaknesses of the
spectrum of fora and approaches to remediation. These include governmental (state) tri-
bunals, international tribunals, and nonstate/arbitration councils established by consortia
of businesses (organized variously by region and industry). The Report's critique of the
limits of redress for corporations' host-state human rights violations, as available in home
state courts, is powerful. Travel and litigation costs, jurisdictional and other procedural
hurdles, evidentiary problems, and even defenses based on "state interests" (for example,
as employed in the recent "state secrets" defense used to the advantage of a Boeing subsid-
iary in federal court) 41 Will commonly mean that host states' citizens will not be able to
achieve redress in home states' courts. Too often, according to the 2008 Report, multina-
tionals garner an advantage from ignoring human rights issues in host states that lack the
legal capacity to provide meaningful redress for human rights abuses.
On the subject of remediation, an exciting proposal put forth in the Report is the estab-
lishment of an international "ombudsman"-an office or agency that would advise ag-
grieved persons about the most accessible, practicable and otherwise appropriate modes
for pursuing their allegations of human rights abuse against multinational corporations.
Although it surely represents a conceptual and policy innovation, the 2008 Report
presents itself, appropriately, as only one critical step in what will undoubtedly be an ongo-
ing project of improving corporations' human rights compliance. And the 2008 Report, as
the result of earlier reports in 2006 and 2007,42 presents evidence of progress that would
not "have been conceivable a decade ago," as expressly stated therein.43 And yet such
progress is not tightly linked to formal, legal change, and hence may be fragile. The
progress defined in the 2008 Report, and the guidelines, plans and codes enumerated
therein, are still informal, inchoate, contingent responses to serious international shortfalls
in human rights compliance. State sponsored violence, civil rights abuses, government cor-
ruption triggering famines, worsened public health emergencies and illiteracy; multina-
tionals operating in states where such problems are rife are constantly poised on the cusp
of complicity in human rights abuses. And so long as human rights oversight is informal,
they will have relatively less incentive to stay on the right side of that line.
The most palpable hope is that energy, creativity and purposefulness inherent in the
2008 Report, and the other initiatives it catalogues, will alter social expectations funda-
mentally. To be sure, altered social expectations can lead to formal legal change and great-
er private sector (voluntary) adherence to human rights observance. There's nothing to
41. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2010).
42. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Interim Rep. of the Special Rep. of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
TT 14-16, delivered to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/business/RuggieReport2006.html; U.N. Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Act: Rep. of the Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, T 1, deli-
vered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/SRSG-report-Human-Rights-Council-19-Feb-
2007.pdf.
43. SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 3, 105.
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say that we are not approaching a tipping point in this respect.
III. Comments on Backer's Critique of the 2008 Ruggie Report
A. The Importance of History
The Introduction and first substantive section of Backer's article provide an intellec-
tual and practical history to the 2008 Report.44 We get an account of the many private sec-
tor, voluntary business initiatives aimed at fostering human rights compliance, including
global reporting initiatives and the Guidelines for Multinational Corporations promulgated
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 45 We also learn
about the prior efforts by UN agencies, including the UN Global Compact and the aban-
doned UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (again, the "Norms").46 Finally, Backer offers a
description of the conceptual and policy evolution of Ruggie's annual reports beginning in
2006.47
Why so much history? Perhaps to human rights scholars the answer is obvious. But,
notably, it would not be to corporate law scholars. In the tradition of law and economics,
corporate law teaching and scholarship has eschewed historical inquiry.48 Instead, atten-
tion has been devoted to more contemporary and quantitative analysis. For example, cor-
porate legal scholars have developed a passion for event studies seeking to correlate stock
price movements with governance changes at the level of individual firms. A similarly
quantitative, ahistorical approach has been directed at studying the financial results of
hedge funds and private equity funds, and their governance. And at the theoretic level, for
example, game theory has been employed to study whether any corporate laws should be
mandatory. Even securities regulation has been analyzed, in most recent scholarship, in
terms which are largely quantitative, theoretical and ahistorical. 49
Human rights law appears different in this regard. Perhaps this is because its history is
so recent. Also significant to the inclusion of history, I suspect, is the field's contingency, its
overtly constructed, optative nature. Human rights law is an ongoing, deliberative, inter-
pretive project; as such, its core tenets are intelligible only when viewed in institutional
44. See Backer, supra note 2.
45. Id. at 41-50.
46. Id. at 45-50.
47. Id. at 50-68.
48. Under the auspices of the newly formed Adolphe A. Berle Jr. Center on Corporate Governance, its
founder, Professor O'Kelley, is providing a greater scholarly platform for historical inquiry in the area
of corporate law history and twentieth century corporate political economy. See, e.g., Charles O'Kelley,
Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1141 (2010). For other notable exceptions, see, for
example, LAWRENCE MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: How FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY
(2001), and MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1996).
49. A wonderful deviation from this ahistorical focus, which helps to make sense of the broader arc of the
securities laws, is contained in the library and archives of the SEC Historical Society. SEC HISTORICAL
SOCIETY, http://www.sechistorical.org/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2010); see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE (Northeastern Univ. Press 1995) (1982).
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and historical context.5 0 Backer's article accomplishes this feat of historical survey and con-
textualization clearly and succinctly, which is a great service to the Report and its readers.
B. The New Governance: Hard and Soft Law
At the most superficial level people consider "law" to be the rules that cannot be disre-
garded without risk of civil or criminal sanction. Nevertheless, as a concept, "law" is patent-
ly broader, more amalgamated and elusive than any such "risk of sanction" approach cap-
tures. This appears to be especially true of human rights law. As Tom Tyler's writing
illuminates, the term "law" vests widely shared concepts and standards with added social
authority, that is, legitimacy. Laws are most commonly adhered to when they are interna-
lized as legitimate-principled, rational and coherent.5 1 Rather than the mathematics of
risk of detection multiplied by sanctions, adherence to law is most commonly inspired by
law's instantiation of widely shared values.sz
Seen from this perspective, human rights law is handicapped at two levels: the practical
and the conceptual. The limits of sovereignty pose a functional, practical problem for hu-
man rights law in terms of enforcement and sanction.53 And value pluralism and cultural
difference pose challenges to the commonality of understandings necessary for internaliza-
tion and voluntary adherence. Furthermore, most germanely for this analysis, the dis-
course of "business and human rights" is especially thorny because it is aimed (especially)
at large, faceless bureaucracies. From the perspective of human rights theory and injunc-
tions, we may be dealing with an anonymous corporate shell, which is inherently proble-
matic, of course; or we may be seeking to identify the real, human corporate executives. If
the latter, we are attempting to promulgate standards to address persons of many different
tongues, cultures, ethnicities and disparate professional/occupational statures.
These practical and conceptual challenges, in part, explain why the 2008 Report, in at-
tempting to make progress in the business and human rights area, took the "duty to re-
spect" as its organizing principle for businesses. That duty, at least superficially, seems
conceptually simpler, less alarming, and more practicable. The principle, indeed, appears
almost self-evident; of course corporations would have a duty to "do no harm." Again, the
duty to respect framework presents itself as more appealing for being (seemingly) more
simple, practicable and thus rewarding for corporations to espouse. As Ruggie and Backer
emphasize, the substantive duties implied in "respecting" human rights can evolve gradual-
ly, and through both formal law-making and informal "soft law" practices and guidelines.
The duty to respect is, quite obviously, a derivative duty; a duty contemplating that anoth-
er body has assumed responsibility for defining human rights and outlawing their abuse.
50. See RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY'S LAW (2011).
51. See TOM TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND
BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 77 (2000).
52. For a fascinating analysis of the theoretical bases for recognition of private law beyond sovereign
borders, see Florian R6dl, Private Law Beyond the Democratic Order? On the Legitimatory Problem of
Private Law "Beyond the State," 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 743 (2008).
53. The problem is illustrated, for example, by the controversy surrounding the legitimacy and authority
surrounding the International Criminal Court-which still lacks the full support of the United States
and many other countries.
114
HeinOnline  -- 9 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 114 2011
Global Finance, Multinationals and Human Rights
States' duties to protect their citizens against human rights abuses need a more absolute,
harder, legal edge than does a "duty to respect."54
In this respect, the Ruggie reports mandate that corporations "respect" human rights is
a product and reflection the new governance movement.5 5 And Professor Backer's analysis
of the Report's synthesis of "harder" human rights laws and principles with "softer" guide-
lines and norms is illuminating. As Backer recognizes, the "hard plus soft" synthesis en-
compassed in the PRR framework is intellectually exciting; it is also potentially confound-
ing-confusing especially because the new governance movement is itself a moving target.
"New governance"-the admixture of hard law and softer rules and norms to achieve poli-
cy objectives-means different things to different professional and academic communities.
Industry, government, nonprofit, legal and academic communities (and subgroups); each is
likely to have different perspectives on the benefits and drawbacks of soft versus hard law,
"self-regulation" versus regulation by government.
At least prior to the financial crisis, corporate and securities law scholars, as well as pol-
icy makers, overwhelmingly embraced the tenets of the new governance and the virtues of
private (soft) "self-regulation." In these fields, of course, the preference for self-regulation
has not been driven by value pluralism, but by faith in the enhanced efficiency (overall cost
reduction) associated with private bodies' looser and more local standards setting.5 6 Some
examples may be illuminating. In corporate and securities law, scholars and policy makers
have favored "default" or "optional" rules, especially ones arising from the stock exchanges
or other private sector bodies. For example (again, prior to Dodd-Frank), responsibility for
market regulation had come to rest mostly within the Financial Industry Regulatory Agen-
cy (FINRA). 57 FINRA, a stand-alone, private regulatory body, was formed by the combining
the rule-making functions of both the New York Stock Exchange and the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers. The same impulse supported the promulgation of accounting
rules by the (private) "Financial Accounting Standards Board," and auditing oversight by
the (private) Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.58 Even Delaware's courts of eq-
uity-the most nationally influential courts in corporate law-have favored "intra-
corporate solutions" such as ratification by subcommittees of "independent" directors or
54. For Ruggie's own discussion of the challenge, see John Gerard Ruggie, Business & Human Rights: The
Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819 (2007).
55. See Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004); see also
Michael Wilkinson, Three Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 673 (2010).
56. See, e.g., Saule Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, BROOK. J.
INT'L L. (forthcoming) (explaining that the project of rethinking self-regulation in the financial indus-
try has, of course, more than begun); Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And
How It Doesn't), Columbia Law School, Law and Economics Workshop (Sept 20, 2010); Gillian Had-field-Curriculum Vitae, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://awweb.usc.edu/contact/contactinfo.cfm?detaillD=220 (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
57. For the argument that the internationalization of capital has effectuated a system of enhanced ex-
change-based financial regulation and regulatory competition, see Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges
and the New Market for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435 (2008).
58. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For dis-
cussion, see Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Pub-
lic/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005).
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votes of a majority of (disinterested) shareholders as modes of dispute resolution implicit-
ly superior to judicial oversight.59 These are only a few of the myriad corporate and securi-
ties oversight and regulatory functions assigned to "self-regulatory," private bodies.
The guiding motive behind these modes of self-regulation is the belief that soft law/self
regulation is less costly, more flexible and thus conducive to maximizing private actors'
wealth-again, "efficiency." And there's no doubt that laws promulgated by legislatures
(state or federal) or even specialized administrative agencies (as they're encumbered by
due process requirements, including notice and comment) are less easily modified and
slower to evolve. But commercial self-regulation is most legitimate in situations where
there is little danger of persistent inequalities of bargaining power and equal access to in-
formation. Where these conditions do not pertain, self-regulation is too likely to operate as
a variation on regulatory capture. Privatizing regulation does nothing to limit pervasive
conflicts of interest, for example. And without doubt the economic debacle which began in
2007 is forcing the financial services industry and most governments, citizens and even
lawyers to rethink the excesses of "soft law"/self-regulation. 60
The financial and corporate experiment with "soft law" and new governance has been
sufficiently problematic as to invite sharp skepticism. But perhaps in the human rights
area, the appropriate question may be "compared to what?" Ruggie and Backer, at least,
appear relatively sanguine about what "soft law" can add to the mix in the business and
human rights area. Each portrays soft law human rights programs aimed at elevating cor-
porations' adherence to human rights as being complementary to states' hard law duties in
the area. Of course, neither Ruggie's nor Backer's enthusiasm for soft law solutions is based
on the same notion of enhanced efficiency or profit-making described above. The keystone
would seem to be, rather, complementarity; in this vision, the soft law mandates pick up on
the space left by voids in hard law, and support and amplify the tents of hard law where
they do overlap. Backer's terminology for this synthesis of hard and soft law into a web of
interconnected, overlapping mandates is "polycentricity," a term which, in his usage, is sa-
turated with heightened promise. States' hard law duty to protect citizens against human
rights abuses (including abuses by corporations) are strengthened, supported, amplified
by corporations' soft law duty to respect human rights. As for remedies, moreover, in this
area there is a marriage, a resolution of this dualism, as envisioned in the PRR framework.
What to make of this enthusiasm, this acceptance of the potentially soft, shifting ground
59. The most aggressive of such proposals involves eliminating judicial review of controlling sharehold-
ers' freezeout transactions where there's been majority of the minority shareholder consent and spe-
cial committee consent. See, e.g., In re Cox Communs., Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. Ch.
2005). For commentary, see Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and
the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305 (2005).
60. The ranks of the working-age poor climbed to the highest level since the 1960's as the recession
threw millions of people out of work last year, leaving one in seven Americans in poverty. Erik Eck-
holm, Recession Raises Poverty to a 15-Year High, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/us/17poverty.html? r=1. The overall poverty rate climbed to
14.3 percent, 43.6 million people, the Census Bureau said Thursday in its annual report on the eco-
nomic well being of U.S. households. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-238, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf.
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of soft law-the potential faddishness of "new governance?" The UN Norms on Business
and Human Rights might have obtained relatively greater, mandatory force by leveraging
treaties into a "nexus of contracts" promoting business and human rights compliance. So,
was the abandonment of the Norms' approach in favor of Ruggie's a positive move? I be-
lieve it was, but not for the reasons elucidated by Ruggie and Backer. The 2008 Report
states that the Norms' assignment of principal and secondary responsibilities among the
state and corporations, and the delimiting of human rights responsibilities between them,
presented irresolvable ambiguities. Backer's enthusiasm for what he describes as "poly-
centricity" is less obvious, but seems to rest on the conviction that combining some "hard"
human rights law with a lot of soft law guidelines addressed to multinationals will up the
ante of compliance and the cost of noncompliance.
I believe that the approach endorsed in 2008 Report is superior to that in the Norms,
but for subtle and tactical reasons, rather than explicit or conceptual ones. Put simply, the
PRR framework is likely to be more effective because it sounds easier and more "doable"
for companies. It will produce less alarm, and hence less resistance. The 2008 Report's ge-
nius is leveraging standard, existing business (and business law) concepts to promote mul-
tinationals' human rights compliance-concepts like "due diligence" and internal controls.
The more palatable, softer law mandate to "respect" human rights, in contrast to a duty on
the part of companies to "protect" human rights, is simply more likely to garner adherents.
This is because corporate executives on the ground are forced to make choices in condi-
tions of scarcity and uncertainty. The "duty to protect" sounds too absolute, too speciously
clear for executives to adopt it as a rule of decision in real conditions, including time and
financial constraints. The seemingly easier, seemingly more flexible and forgiving "duty to
respect" would appear more worthwhile to attempt. Setting achievable goals for corpora-
tions-selling the program to corporate actors as one that is both achievable and potential-
ly "profitable" (a fortiori not excessively costly or troublesome to implement)-is surely
part of the battle.
As an example of this "under-sell, over-deliver," the 2008 Report gives real content to
the duty to respect in its description of corporate human rights due diligence. It captures
how fact-specific and contextually precise it must be; thus the fact that it is not susceptible
to programmatic compliance. 61 As the 2008 Report states, businesses' appropriate atten-
tiveness to avoiding human rights abuses will require an appraisal of country/regional fac-
tors, firm-specific practices and the company's network of supplier and customer opera-
tions. 62 In such a dynamic environment, hands-on executives-sometimes on their own,
and often in conjunction with their lawyers and boards' committees-will be required to
make situationally specific judgment calls in interpreting the mandates of "do no harm."
Clearly, this is not the kind of duty that lends itself to hard specification ex ante. As the
2008 Report implicitly suggests, the key is to encourage and incentivize business leaders to
account for the downside of corporate human rights abuses as part of their business judg-
ment-the totality of their acts and decisions in overseeing corporate affairs-rather than
61 SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 3, IT 73-81.
62. Id. J1 56-64.
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as an afterthought. In sum, the soft law "duty to respect" framework is likely to be more pa-
latable for corporate leaders and their advisers than would the timber of a hard law "duty
to protect." The former better comports with corporate managers' business judgment than
would more intrusive human rights law-making.63
Thus I think that Backer slightly misses the mark in his somewhat overzealous embrace
of "polycentricity," and the "more is more" perspective of public law new governance. It's
not accidental that the 2008 Report itself never mentions anything remotely like the "new
governance movement." Indeed there is virtually no discussion of the difference between
"hard" and "soft law." Nor is there even a subtle flavoring of the academic, theoretic lexicon
of international law (including terms like "polycentricity"). This is because the 2008 Report
is aimed at skeptics and practioners: business executives, politicians, "hard-knuckled" cor-
porate lawyers. It asks only that executives take account of human rights compliance as
part of their existing internal controls and risk management functions. 64 Again, the under-
sell, over-deliver: Now what could be problematic about that?
C Due Diligence and the Problem of Complicity
As mentioned above, in elaborating the content of the duty to respect, the 2008 Report
invokes the concept of corporate "due diligence."65 As described therein, corporate human
rights due diligence should encompass the gathering of information about rights-based
"risks," creating statements of goals and standards, and integrating them throughout the
different levels of the corporate organization. 66 In addition, it would be essential for com-
panies to measure and systematically revisit compliance goals. As part of their existing in-
ternal controls programs, corporations do this kind of assessment in many areas, of course.
The communications and technology revolutions described earlier have radically improved
corporations' ease in conducting just these kinds of fact intensive assessments, the disse-
mination of codes and guidelines, and the monitoring of compliance throughout the enter-
prise.67 One would think that the challenge of remaining efficient, which is to say profitable,
would demand a nearly constant refinement of the corporation's data and information ga-
63. There's little doubt that American corporate law affords corporate directors substantial leeway to
avoid the public and corporate harms arising from human rights abuses. This discretionary space ex-
ists within the construct of "the business judgment rule." For a recent review of the grounds of board
primacy (from the perspective of efficiency or civil society theory), see Grant Hayden & Matthew T.
Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2071 (2010).
64. For the argument that accurate and comprehensive internal reporting, up to the offices of senior
management, the board and shareholders, as required, is the most vital component of corporate fidu-
ciary duty, see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking the Relationship of
Corporate Fiduciary Duty and Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REv. 505 (1999-2000).
65. For a famous account of corporate due diligence in relation to corporate securities offering materials,
see Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
66. For an early statement of the comprehensive importance of internal corporate information gathering
and reporting systems, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING (1987); for commentary on its gradual ac-
ceptance into the corporate governance framework, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors
and Internal Controls, 19 CARDoZo L. REv. 237 (1997-1998).
67. For the landmark instance, see Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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thering and reporting systems. Although they will not spit out solutions, these systems
should readily be adaptable to encompassing the reporting of facts and risk factors asso-
ciated with human rights abuses. 68
Some further discussion of the concept of corporate due diligence is appropriate, in or-
der to understand how it is employed by the 2008 Report, and corporate lawyers and ex-
ecutives. Corporate lawyers do "due diligence" for their business clients prior to a variety
of transactions and events. Due diligence is practiced prior to offerings of securities and
the preparation of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, so that the state-
ments made therein correspond to the true condition of the business. 69 Due diligence is al-
so required prior to mergers and other sale-of-business transactions, for valuation and risk
assessment purposes, and so that the representations in the contracts will match the con-
dition of the business, consistent with the parties' agreement. The firm's lawyers work
hand in hand with corporate senior executives to achieve these reporting and contractual
objectives.
The understanding of due diligence that the 2008 Report employs is not less transac-
tionally specific. Rather it's a more recent one arising from the literature on internal con-
trols, as well as practical improvements in information management and internal controls
systems. This emphasis on internal control systems is pervasive in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
although it relates principally to financial reporting therein. As relates to improved finan-
cial transparency and the avoidance of illegality, ongoing due diligence exists as a "moni-
toring obligation" of the board of directors. It reflects a mandate arising first within the au-
diting literature, and later within the securities literature and finally within the equitable
jurisprudence of corporate fiduciary law. This trend in favor of enhanced internal and ex-
ternal corporate transparency reflects decades of evolution, harkening back to the original
Treadway Report of 1987,70 and even earlier to the books and records provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (which Congress included in the securities laws a decade
earlier).7 1 Within the scholarly discourse of international law, transparency and the ac-
countability it makes possible have always been a 'first principle' of good governance.
The challenge presented by the 2008 Report's human rights due diligence construct is
not its novelty, or even its feasibility. Nor is the monitoring cost, as such, a critical factor. In
cases where there would be a substantial risk of corporate complicity in human rights
abuse firms will have powerful incentives, direct financial ones as well as reputational
ones, to invest resources in avoiding them. (This assumes, of course, that the corporation is
68. Many corporate commentators have suggested that we are on the verge of moving to a system of real
time corporate disclosure, instead of the system of periodic reporting with updating on Form 8-K or
as necessary to obviate selective disclosure (as required by Regulation Fair Disclosure). But the law
has not moved that far yet.
69. Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 696. Note, too, that due diligence is becoming more complicated and less effec-
tive in a "shelf offering" world. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (establishing new disclosure requirements for securitiza-
tions as shelf offerings); WorldCom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
70. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING, supra note 66.
71. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
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well run and its managers/agents are acting in good faith.) The problem with the due dili-
gence concept endorsed in the 2008 Report is the danger for the firm of having an operat-
ing but seriously flawed system; or otherwise a good system but a manager with seriously
flawed judgment. If a corporation has a smart, reasonably well constructed system of due
diligence and human rights risk assessment, as well as reasonably well informed and well
advised leaders, then its internal controls systems, as part of ongoing due diligence, should
help the company avoid serious or ongoing abuses of human rights. And even if abuses do
occur, well advised firms with rigorous human rights compliance and oversight systems
should, at least, avoid legal liability and harsher public opprobrium.
The danger arises in cases where the due diligence and compliance programs are poorly
designed or recklessly or infrequently monitored. Paltry due diligence efforts or poorly run
compliance programs may be worse than none if trouble ensues. This is because they may
suggest knowledge of wrongdoing and indifference. Poor monitoring or compliance may
present themselves as corporate smugness, if not "green-washing." The 2008 Report is, na-
turally, silent about this unintended consequence of poor corporate due diligence in the
human rights area. Professor Backer, however, astutely notes the risk.72 And it is a signifi-
cant challenge for firms contemplating establishing human rights compliance and due dili-
gence programs. Colloquially speaking, they may be damned if they don't, but damaged if
their execution is decidedly poor.
Furthermore, as a separate matter (as both Ruggie and Backer acknowledge), corporate
"complicity" is a thick, elusive concept.7 3 It has both a strict legal definition, and an extra-
legal, lay meaning which is at once far broader and more elusive. The scope of legal com-
plicity in human rights abuses would track, most probably, the scienter and causality con-
cepts operative in corporate criminal law (and, with slight variation, in securities law fraud
cases). Given this high bar, proving corporate complicity in cases of alleged human rights
abuses in a court of law would ordinarily be difficult in all but the most egregious cases.
The twenty-six years that plaintiffs spent pursuing a remedy against Union Carbide on ac-
count of the tragedy in Bhopal, and the limited success of the result, stand as illustration. 74
The same is true of the criminal trial against W.R. Grace employees for poisoning the popu-
lation of Libby, Montana through toxic asbestos exposure (the technical nature of the
charge was "knowing endangerment"). Despite a hard-driving federal prosecution team
that pressed forward for close to a decade, not one of the executives who had been in
charge of decades of egregious asbestos leaks from a local refinery in Libby (that was
owned and operated by W.R. Grace) was held "complicit" in the population's poisoning.75
72 Backer, supra note 2 at 77-78.
73 Id.; SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 3, TT 73-81.
74. In June 2010, seven ex-employees, including the former Union Carbide chairman, were convicted in
Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of about
$2000 each, the maximum punishment allowed by law. Lydia Polygreen & Hari Kumar, 8 Former Ex-
ecutives Guilty in '84 Bhopal Chemical Leak, N.Y. TiMES, June 7, 2010, at A8. An eighth former employee
was also convicted but died before judgment was passed. Id.
75. For reference to an extensive archive of trial related materials and commentary see WR. Grace, Ex-
ecutives, Acquitted in W.R. Grace Criminal Trial, ASBESTOS NETWORK,
http://www.asbestosnetwork.com/news/nw-060209-wr-grace.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
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But legal complicity is not all that's at stake, of course, even just in terms of money.
Where there are persistent claims of serious human rights abuses, social opprobrium may
trigger costly consumer, investor and even employee backlash. Such backlash is not con-
strained by the structures of civil procedure and law. In a world where there is growing
popular concern about human rights compliance, as well as growing technological capacity
to post any form of "smoking gun" evidence to the web, the prospect of more aggressive
human rights due diligence will be a two-edged sword for companies and executives. Con-
sumers, employees, investors and governments will each expect if not demand it. Corpora-
tions will become more accustomed to these expectations, and to their commitments, if not
their duties, to live up to them.
D. A "Conceptual Framework" Light on Theory
The 2008 Report acknowledges the very different structure and incentives that operate
in business corporations, in contrast to states. As stated therein: "[CJorporations are . . .
economic organs, not democratic public interest institutions. As such, their responsibilities
cannot and should not mirror the duties of States."7 6 Furthermore, the PRR framework is
definitive in attributing to states, and only states, the responsibility for protecting citizens
against human rights abuses, whether by individuals, corporate enterprises or other insti-
tutions. It is remarkable that, while the 2008 Report describes itself as a "conceptual and
policy framework,"7 7 it scrupulously avoids grand pronouncements about the place of mul-
tinational corporations (or any corporations) in the social structure.
To elaborate, there are no references to civil society theory. There are no references to
social contract theory. There are no references to democratic theory. Nor, even, is there
mention of corporate "legal personhood." Nevertheless, in reading the Report, we don't in-
itially notice these omissions. Indeed, my view is that the Report gains greater force and
coherence by eschewing theory. Rather, it presents a meaningfully practical account of
how corporate culture may be shaped, by states and by corporations themselves, to actual-
ize greater respect for human rights by employees, managers and agents. According to the
Report, it is the phenomenon of globalization-the enhanced scope and scale of corporate
operations in conjunction with limits on legal compliance arising from law's historic "stick-
iness" to national boundaries-that is the "causal" agent behind the 2008 Report's
mandate to promote corporate compliance with human rights. The unifying idea, the point
of departure, is reducing anarchy and suffering, and apportioning responsibility in a way
that is realistic and practicable, as well as intelligible and coherent. As stated previously,
although advertised as a "conceptual and policy framework" it is not theory which drives
the mandate, but rather the darkness of the realities on the ground and the raised expecta-
tions of the public.
And yet Backer accepts the notion that the Report supplies a "conceptual framework."
According to him, that conceptual framework synthesizes legal obligations and social
76. SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 3, 53.
77. Id. 1 1.
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norms into a "multi-level system of polycentric governance."78 As Backer describes it, the
"Three-Pillar framework acknowledges the reality of non-state governance systems cen-
tered on the regulatory community of economic actors."79 Elsewhere Backer states that the
report "builds a system [of corporate commitments] that is not tied to the state ... but ra-
ther grounded in social legitimacy and what might be understood as disciplinary and cultu-
rally embedded techniques."8 0 In this, perhaps Professor Backer is rereading the 2008 Re-
port in light of Professor Ruggie's earlier political science writing on "embedded
liberalism."81 An accomplished political scientist, there is no doubt that Ruggie could have
waxed theoretical in establishing a conceptual framework for his Report if he so chose.
Presumably he eschewed such theorizing in the interest of avoiding controversy and pro-
moting the adoption of the PRR framework.
As an academic, in contrast to an activist, I can dilate a bit longer on the issue of theory,
however. Leaving aside embedded liberalism, the most obvious theoretic "peg" would have
been corporate personalty. Corporate personalty has recently been revived as a theory for
mandating or proscribing conduct by the United States Supreme Court, and corporate per-
sonalty is very much part of the present policy debate. According to the Court, the Constitu-
tion sufficiently recognizes the corporation-as-person concept so that "the corporation's"
participation in politics, even its funding campaign advertising, cannot be proscribed with-
out running afoul of the First Amendment. That is the import of the recent, highly contro-
versial decision in Citizens United v. FEC decision, which has substantially "freed up" corpo-
rate election spending."
So why would Ruggie assiduously avoid delving into the corporate personalty construct
as a vehicle for the "duty to respect"? After all, since it is accepted international law that all
persons have a duty to respect human rights, the conceit would seem useful; yet Ruggie
avoided it. What about the concept of the legal personalty of the corporation was found in-
sufficient or unhelpful? Here is one illuminating possibility: All human persons exist in a
place and have a certain, specified citizenship. Real persons do not escape the bounds of
sovereignty, except in extraordinary cases (for example, in the absence of treaties on
extradition). And very, very few human persons have the scope of influence that multina-
tional corporations do. But corporations, though we speak of them as "persons," are entire-
ly different from natural persons in this respect. Certainly, in their multinational incarna-
tion, on account of their intangible nature, they transcend geographic and political
boundaries. They exist and do not exist in multiple places simultaneously; indeed they may
operate in some places where, for some legal purposes, they don't "exist" at all. As the 2008
Report signals in its introduction, the globalization problem is catalyzed by the limits of
state sovereignty and the contingent nature of international law, especially in relation to
78. Backer, supra note 2, at 80.
79. Id. at 68.
80. Id. at 68-69.
81. John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the
Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379 (1982).
82. Citizens United v. FEC, --- U.S. --- , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). For a landmark case establishing the "sepa-
rate" legal personhood of a corporation, see Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518
(1819).
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intangible entities like corporations. This is what forces the business and human rights is-
sue to the fore. And because of the "slipperiness" of the corporate person, the "corporate
personalty" theory does nothing to help resolve the legal and enforcement problems posed
by multinational business enterprises in the human rights area. As such, the corporate per-
sonalty concept is not a useful vehicle for advancing the goals of the 2008 Report. Thus
Ruggie astutely avoids it, consciously or not, as a pointless distraction.
For corporate legal scholars interested in business and human rights, however, the cor-
porate personalty issue is interesting and even relevant. This is because the robustness of
the corporate person was not always universally accepted among the states, even in early
twentieth century American jurisprudence. As Professor Tung and other scholars (includ-
ing myself) have noted, a feature of the "corporations as creatures of state law" notion en-
compassed a risk that states other than the chartering state would not fully recognize a
corporation's full set of legal powers (i.e., those established by the chartering state).8 3 Nor
was this a matter of a foreign states trampling on established law. It simply had not been
self-evident that all corporate powers "travelled." In essence, the concept of corporate per-
sonalty-the inviolability of corporate rights to property, powers to sue and limited liabili-
ty of its shareholders-is a legal tautology. That a corporation's rights "belong" to it, irres-
pective of where it operates, is true simply because the principle has been accepted by
states and governments as being true. Such corporate powers, it would appear, have been
accepted as existing and travelling with the corporation wherever it operates not because
of logical or principled reasons, but because the recognition of these rights is seen as en-
couraging capital formation and economic development. The rationale is instrumental ra-
ther than formal. In sum, it's not apparent that there is any political, social or legal "theory"
that has evolved to keep pace with the legal, conceptual and technological development of
the modern corporation as an engine of economic development.
Backer fills the theoretic void in the 2008 Report by pointing to what he sees as an in-
ternationally meaningful framework of social legitimacy, and the limits, he asserts, such
consensus implies on legitimate corporate action. 84 I'm not sure I'm convinced that such a
consensus exists. Even on the matter of torture, the issue of defining absolute human rights
is growing ever more thorny. And so is the issue of corporations' complicity, for example,
in the setting of aid to extraordinary rendition (as illustrated by the Mohamed v. Jeppesen
case). As they fall outside of the Freedom of Information Act, and given the hurdles and
bars to corporate criminal prosecution, corporations may be situated as ideal conduits for
unsavory state actions that could not be accomplished directly. This makes the analysis of
corporate responsibilities and corporate complicity in human rights even more compelling
and timely.
123
83. See Tung, supra note 24, at 35-47; see also Stevelman, supra note 24, at 75-78.
84. Backer, supra note 2, at 67.
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IV. Further Thoughts on "Protect, Respect, Remedy"
A. What is International Human Rights "Law?"
These comments are, in part, an extension of the issues raised in the discussion of
new governance, above. But here I raise the more basic question of how rules worthy of be-
ing construed as "law" are constituted in international law, especially in the pluralistic area
of human rights. The problem here is not merely to reconcile "hard" and "soft" law into
something persuasively coherent that can be respected as law. Instead, the issue is how in-
ternational law becomes "law," in the absence of a global sovereign, for example. One ap-
proach, of course, is to look to the areas where there is consent (e.g., on the basis of binding
treaties or even "customary international law"). Another approach would be to look to the
United Nations, although even the Security Council does not operate authoritatively in the
mode of a sovereign over nations. (The United Nations is said to have "no will" apart from
those of its members.) Leaving aside the metaphysics, how are human rights standards
upheld as "law" when there are deep conflicts or misunderstandings and allegations of un-
conscionable abuse? How are human rights standards "made" effective?
Further insight may come from reference to the Law and Society movement, which
draws upon insights from the social sciences in answering questions like these. For Law
and Society scholars (such as my colleague, Frank Munger) the question provokes deeper
scrutiny of socio-legal institutions, the patterns and processes by which they are staffed
and operated, and the assumptions, customs and belief systems that support them. 5 More
prosaically, for any of us who have dealt with or been immediately affected by even local
courts or legislative bodies (by adulthood this is probably most of us), the question of who
gets to make an authoritative law and apply it to our lives takes on new force. The creation
of law is a fascinating and mysterious mode of cultural production. This is, I adventure, one
reason why legal academics mostly remain enthralled by their field even after years of
study.
I have no magic answer to the "what is international law?" question. Some say the ques-
tion is fundamentally misleading and must be replaced by: "What can international law ef-
fectively do to solve problems?" Here is what I can add, by reference to my field. Interna-
tional law scholars wrestle with these most basic questions, and yet they almost all make a
leap of faith. They accept the possibility of international "law" making, and go from there.
For corporate and securities law scholars, the "mystery" of international law may
produce a deeper skepticism. Corporate and securities lawyers are trained to find a way to
accomplish the goals of their clients. This will frequently involve developing an under-
standing of where there are vacuums in the law, at least vacuums in their enforceability.
For corporate and securities lawyers, the key is the "negative space"; the opposite may be
true for internationalists. They are motivated to see the larger patterns arising in interna-
85. See, e.g., Frank Munger, Globalization, Investing in Law, and the Careers of Lawyers for Social Causes:
Taking on Rights in Thailand, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 745 (2009); see also DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W.
MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
(2003) (analyzing beliefs about what the law is and how those beliefs influence everyday action).
124
HeinOnline  -- 9 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 124 2011
Global Finance, Multinationals and Human Rights
tional laws, despite the gaps and shortfalls. For human rights scholars and activists, it's im-
portant to begin with an awareness of this likely deep skepticism about international law
on the part of corporate and financial lawyers. And from this perspective the absence of
theory and deeper legal principle in the 2008 Report may indeed be a problematic short-
fall.
On the other hand, there are reasons for corporate counselors to be preoccupied with
their clients' human rights compliance irrespective of whether it's legally mandated. That
is, the court of public opinion has entirely different rules than do civil or criminal courts.
Corporate senior executives, boards and their firms stand to be vilified, boycotted and oth-
erwise financially harmed by the exposure and wide publication of damaging facts, irres-
pective of whether they would constitute a definitive human rights abuse actionable in any
court of law. Here, the facts and the ground and the court of public opinion may get ahead
of the law. Executives, boards and firms will care equally as much about being harmed by
egregious allegations of human rights abuses, especially where the allegations are backed
up by snapshots, or videos or snippets of recorded conversations that can be posted to the
Web. So companies and their managers have this motive to take international human
rights issue seriously, and increasingly they do. This reality, and the costs it threatens to
impose on companies, will make counseling corporate executives and boards on interna-
tional human rights compliance an interesting and challenging area of practice.
B. The State's Role in Shaping Corporate Culture
The 2008 Report states, "Governments are uniquely placed to foster corporate cultures
in which respecting rights is an integral part of doing business."86 To a corporate law scho-
lar the statement is arresting. It is obvious that governments can and do encourage and
discourage various forms of corporate conduct. They use the tax laws and administrative
regulations, and even criminal law as necessary, to influence corporate conduct. But for
corporate law scholars, this would not amount to government "shaping corporate culture."
At least, we are not in the habit of thinking about government deliberately shaping corpo-
rate culture, or even what "corporate culture" means and how it can be manipulated by the
state. In eighteen years of reading corporate legal scholarship, for example, I've never read
anything that explicitly endorses the view that government should mold corporate cul-
tures. This most likely reflects the silent power of the neo-liberal ideal. Policy makers and
most academics have accepted that corporations, as much as possible, should be free to fol-
low their own profit-maximizing ends, as they adapt (presumably) to changing conditions
in competitive markets. If we believe in robustly competitive markets, corporate culture
would be an extension or reflection of the market-there's little room for governmental
shaping. And from the perspective of contemporary legal theory, the "nexus of contracts"
view has eradicated the internal space of "corporate culture" that would be susceptible to
being molded.
Yet despite the paucity of discussion of law's role in shaping corporate culture, it is ap-
86. SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 3, 1 29.
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parent that Congress has indeed taken a more active role in going in just this direction. In
enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, for example, Congress sought to raise the base-
line level of corporate transparency and legal accountability for fraud.87 It enacted various
legal improvements in internal controls and auditing requirements, heightened execu-
tive/managerial accountability for achieving corporate transparency, general counsel re-
sponsibility for alerting the senior-most officers to evidence of unlawful corporate conduct,
heightened protections for whistleblowers and other measures designed to promote cor-
porate cultures more in keeping with the rule of law. Indeed, this is precisely why the Act
proved so controversial: It was not aimed at maximizing short term profits. Indeed, com-
pliance would increase costs in the short term, even if it would increase confidence in in-
vesting in U.S. firms over the longer term. Many legal commentators argued that the Act's
costs would discourage listing in the United States.8 8 To the contrary, a few legal scholars
realized that the scope and magnitude of the accounting scandals signaled there was a
wide-ranging problem in the corporate culture, even at seemingly "blue chip" American
firms. These "contrarian" scholars defended Sarbanes-Oxley as a well-intentioned legal
program to move corporate culture in the direction of transparency and accountability 8 9-
even as they recognized the contingent and incomplete nature of the Act.
Another explanation for the paucity of discussion of corporate culture by corporate legal
scholars lies in the focus of our interdisciplinary work. Although corporate law scholars
have mined the literature and wisdom of neo-classical micro-economic analysis, we have
been rather less attuned to the findings from studies of group and organizational psychol-
ogy-lessons which would help us better understand corporate culture, and the forces and
institutions which shape it.90 Ruggie's notion of corporate culture should be further studied
by corporate legal scholars concerned with making a contribution to elevating corporate
conscientiousness about human rights. 91
In fact, although we don't directly discuss the issue, I'm sure that all corporate law scho-
lars have a view of law's role in shaping the conduct and incentives of executives and cor-
87. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 203, § 10A, 116 Stat. 745, 773 (2002) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-781 (2002)) (audit partner rotation); Id. § 304, 116 Stat. at 778 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2002)) (forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits); Id. § 401, 116
Stat. at 785 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7261 (2002)) (disclosures in periodic reports); Id. §
404, 116 Stat. at 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002)) (management assessment of
internal controls).
88. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
89. See, e.g., John C. Coates, IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 ). EcoN. PERSP. 91
(2007); lames Fanto, A Social Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 52 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 517 (2007-2008).
90. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001).
91. Following the spate of high level accounting fraud scandals which broke after 2001, certain "progres-
sive" corporate legal scholars turned their attention to this issue of corporate culture. For example,
corporate legal scholars Marlene O'Connor and Lynne Dallas wrote about law, group psychology and
corporate groups (especially as related to the problem of "group think" and executives' seemingly ir-
rational assessment of risk). See Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corpo-
rations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron's Demise, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1233 (2003).
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porations, i.e., "corporate culture." It's just that we don't generally acknowledge the is-
sue/phenomenon in such terms. Indeed, reference to corporate culture in recent years
would have seemed out of place, naive, suggestive (potentially) of ignorance about micro-
economics and the influence of markets on firms. And for a corporate legal scholar nothing
could make a worse impression amongst one's peers. Sarbanes-Oxley intended just such an
alteration of corporate culture; and yet the Act did not nearly go far enough. 92
Accordingly, eight years later, in the Dodd-Frank legislation,9 3 Congress was compelled
to embrace a far more wide-ranging agenda, and to rework the governance of the financial
services sector to promote fair dealings, transparency and more rational limits on risk-
taking. Could Congress have left financial services firms to pick up the pieces and redefine,
for themselves, the contours of their new approach-their new "culture"-of lesser leve-
rage, more reasonable risk-taking, more straightforward dealings with consumers and
greater recognition of responsibility to the international financial infrastructure? Could
firms have made these "cultural" shifts on their own? The answer is probably not. The ex-
tant evidence suggests that the profit incentives of high-risk trading and high leverage are
simply too powerful. Government intervention was required to alter this facet of the cul-
ture and conduct of these firms. And such intervention was accepted as legitimate, given
the massive financial bailouts, with taxpayer funds, that their near failure necessitated.
Congressional intervention to mold a new financial services culture was required not
merely to save the firms themselves, but to preserve the existing financial system-and the
American culture which presumes it. In the United States we have just lived through a
transformational moment in the evolution of finance, law-making and corporate culture.
For the millions of Americans who have been left jobless, families without health insur-
ance, without a home of their own and with inadequate food, the connection between
finance, corporations and basic human rights is far less abstract than it had been.
V. Corporate Law: The "Who" and "Why" of Human Rights Compliance
A. Who? Of Boards, Committees, Officers and Shareholders
1. Boards and Committees
Perhaps for constitutional law scholars or social theorists, the failure to discuss political
or social theory-theories bearing on corporations' obligations in relation to human
rights-is the most notable omission in the Report. For human rights scholars, perhaps, the
failure to endorse precise human rights priorities for corporations is the Report's most sa-
lient omission.
But for corporate governance scholars, the Report's most notable omission is its failure
to discuss where the "respecting human rights function" should reside within the corpora-
92. Faith Stevelman, Forward: Corporate Governance Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxey: Is There Real
Change?, 52 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 475 (2008).
93. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376
(2010).
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tion. The question is crucial to the efficacy of the result. And there are many possible op-
tions: the board or a board subcommittee (like the risk management committee), senior
executive officers or even the legal or compliance department.
First, it should be noted that, from the perspective of corporate law, it's axiomatic that
boards have plenary oversight and decision-making responsibility. This responsibility en-
compasses all matters beyond the ordinary scope of business, at least as conceived of in the
formal legal model. The board's responsibility also encompasses the establishment of an
efficacious institutional architecture for the corporation, including the selection and ap-
pointment of the most appropriate, effective senior-level officers for the firm.9 4 This prin-
ciple of primary and plenary authority in the corporate board is reflected in the states' cor-
poration codes, as well as the corporate case law. As for the latter, the "business judgment
rule" restricts shareholders, stakeholders and courts from second-guessing board deci-
sions (absent evidence of conflicts of interest or gross dereliction of duty).95 Nevertheless,
when this touchstone concept of board oversight and authority is applied to the business
and human rights context, difficult issues surface immediately.
The first problem is a supremely practical. Although boards have plenary legal authority
in corporate affairs, for the majority (of public companies') board members, their service is
very part time. Their primary professional obligations are elsewhere. This is a fundamental
contradiction in American corporate governance that scholars and other commentators
have never resolved. Given the number and complexity of corporate tasks and responsibili-
ties assigned to boards within the American system of governance, the formal model is
contradictory and dysfunctional.
Furthermore, the problem of "over-tasked" corporate boards is growing more critical.
The list of matters the board as "ultimate corporate decision-maker" must oversee or (at
least) ratify upon reasonable information is expanding exponentially in scope and com-
plexity. This is a function of new technology, generally heightened expectations about go-
vernance and the byproducts of global operations.
The stop-gap, technical solution to the problem of "too many responsibilities, too little
time" has been to divide the board's functional responsibilities and assign them to specia-
lized board subcommittees. This is licensed by the state statutes, the case law and "best
practices" literature. Committees of outside, independent directors are commonly consti-
94. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (West 2010) ("The business and affairs of every corporation orga-
nized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (2010) (requiring that the business of a corporation shall be managed under the
direction of its board of directors).
95. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (lll. App. Ct. 1968) (holding that the company was not
required to alter its policy against night baseball games, despite the revenue which the games would
quite patently produce); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (refusing to interfere
with the Ford board of directors' business expansion plans even when they garnered shareholder
protest); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1976) (refusing to agree with
shareholders' position that a sale of stock owned by the company would be more advantageous than
distributing it as a dividend, when the board of directors had decided otherwise). For a recent case,
see Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (holding that the board of
directors' decisions regarding business risks in the subprime lending market were not considered a
breach of its fiduciary duty to shareholders).
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tuted in the areas of executive compensation, board nominations, audit and financial re-
porting oversight, shareholder litigation, takeover response, and other matters where con-
flicts of interest present themselves. Increasingly, also, there are "risk management com-
mittees," which quite forseeably could accommodate "human rights risk management." At
least in the abstract, as a matter of formal "fit," such a risk management board committee
looks like the best solution as to where to lodge the human rights compliance function.
And yet the solution is more problematic than it first appears because a human rights
risk management committee-presumably a committee at the parent company level-is
likely to be isolated both geographically and informationally from the immediate area
where rights conflicts will present themselves. Perhaps to avoid just this kind of "bureau-
cratic stacking" and escape from accountability, early codes of incorporation disallowed
companies from owning stock in other companies. The hydra-like structure of holding
companies owning subsidiaries, and subsidiaries of subsidiaries-creating compounding
layers of bureaucracy and plausible deniability-was an organizational impossibility in the
first few decades of the twentieth century.
In an earlier, Jeffersonian tradition, governments were simply loath to allow their com-
mercial "creatures" to grow so powerful, agile and faceless as to pose a threat to state sove-
reignty. Early in the twentieth century, however, the states let go of this "populist" fear of
lack of corporate accountability. That sort of fear (which is distinct from the "fear" of size
which influences antitrust policy) has not informed policy making since the 1930's.96 Only
with the ascent of the Obama administration have we seen genuinely extensive federal re-
regulation in the corporate and financial services sector, in the name of heightened corpo-
rate accountability and reduced reckless risk-taking (with other peoples' money). The Re-
publican "deregulation" revolution launched by Ronald Reagan endured for three decades.
As a matter of state corporate law fiduciary duties, furthermore (as discussed further
below), the fiduciary duty of good faith-which would encompass boards' oversight duties
vis-A-vis human rights-is profoundly indeterminate.97 It's indisputable that the most vital
force influencing boards' and committees' conduct and perspective on human rights law is
not the "letter of the law" or even threat of liability, in most instances. Rather, "the law" op-
erates as part of the rhetorical, persuasive force by which multinational law firms advise
their corporate clients about staying out of legal trouble and the eye of public storms. Such
international law firms, along with the constant threat of unwanted media attention and
public outrage, are the real forces which will drive compliance. In this vein, smart boards
and committees will keep their corporate counselors close at hand and well informed. In
sum, it will be global law firms, rather than the force of law in the abstract, which will drive
corporations' "acclimation" to the greater demands being imposed upon them in the area
of human rights. Anticipating this, global corporate law firms and their cadre of enterpris-
96. For a discussion of changes in attitudes toward the corporate form in the early and mid-twentieth
century, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law (New York
University Center for Law and Business Working Paper No. CLB-99-013, Jan. 2000), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=204528.
97. William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law's Continuing Success, U. ILL. L.
REv. 1 (2009).
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ing, seasoned corporate lawyers have already adopted the "business and human rights"
agenda as part of advising boards, committees and officers on risk management. These
forward-thinking firms have devised institutional programs, compliance plans and codes of
conduct to speak to these emerging issues.98 In this tradition, lawyers like Martin Lipton
(at Wachtell)99 and Ira Millstein (at Weill Gotshall), 100 and law firms like Fried Frank, Eps-
tein Becker, and Foaley Hoag, as well as the American Bar Association (under the aegis of
the Corporate Social Responsibility Committee of the Section on International Law) are
disseminating the message to their partners and clients that human rights compliance is at
the forefront of issues that will be in the spotlight.
This more proactive posture towards corporate human rights compliance is unques-
tionably promising, in respect to greater attentiveness by business compliance lawyers.
And yet there's room for concern as well. This cadre of powerful, elite advocates will re-
constitute themselves as corporate defense counsel, virtually instantaneously, if there are
real concerns about either litigation or substantial negative media exposure.
2. Officers: Chief Compliance Officer, Chief Operating Officer,
General Counsel
Another sensible institutional "platform" for a human rights compliance program is the
office of the Chief Compliance Officer. Over the past decade the legal compliance function
has grown exponentially, as a corporate institution distinct from the corporate law de-
partment. The standard ingredients of compliance include endorsing and enunciating a set
of standards, disseminating the agenda throughout the organization, reinforcing the mes-
sage through a variety of channels of reporting and demonstrating leadership from the top
of the organization. These functions are readily translatable to the area of human rights
compliance.101 This augurs for locating human rights oversight within the compliance de-
98. The 2009 Report refers to plans for a forthcoming survey of lawyers and law firms and their ap-
proaches to business and human rights counseling. See U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the "Protect, Respect and Remedy"
Framework: Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, [ 4, delivered to the Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (April 22, 2009), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/llsession/A.HRC.11.13.pdf. See also Press
Release, United Nations, Leading corporate law firms advise UN Special Representative on business
and human rights (Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Corporate-
law-firms-advise-Ruggie-23-Mar-2009.pdf. Rising interest is also reflected by the recent creation of
the Corporate Social Responsibility Committee within the International Law Section of the American
Bar Association.
99. Wachtell Lipton put out a memo on the SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 3, which was cautionary, if not
critical, of the increasing pressure being brought to bear on boards and firms in general. See Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, A United Nations Proposal Defining Corporate Social Responsibility for Human
Rights (May 1, 2008), available at
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/files/wachtell_1ipton-memo-on-global-business-human
rights.pdf.
100. Ira Millstein, of Weill, Gotshall & Manges, also put out a client memorandum. He was less critical of
the PRR framework and its import for corporate governance.
101. This corporate function gained increased salience as a result of the federal sentencing guidelines per-
taining to corporations. The guidelines expressly endorsed a more "forgiving" approach where corpo-
rations had adopted reasonable compliance programs and endeavored in good faith to implement
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partment, and allocating leadership responsibility to the Chief Compliance Officer. But the
problem with this approach is that it may have the unintended effect of marginalizing the
importance of respect for human rights, on account of the phenomenon of institutional se-
gregation or ghettoization. To recall, in discussing shortfalls in states' human rights
records, Ruggie described this phenomenon as one of "horizontal incoherence": Where the
human rights "function" is cabined at the margins of what are perceived to be more press-
ing concerns. A "check-the-box" approach to human rights compliance will only work when
the situation on the ground is stable and the likelihood of abuses are low. That is, this ap-
proach is prone to be useless when it matters most. The burgeoning literature on corporate
compliance suggests that achieving genuine respect for corporate goals and policies (as
well as respect for law) is far more complicated, especially in far flung parts of an enter-
prise, than it may initially appear.102
What about allocating responsibility for respecting human rights to the office of the
Chief Operating Officer (COO)-even to COOs at subsidiaries in host countries? High func-
tioning COOs will possess the requisite information to anticipate where rights issues are
likely to arise. And if these COOs are in the host country, they are likely to be close enough
to the problem to respond rapidly either ex ante-to prevent serious abuses, or ex post-
to limit the damage and/or provide some form of remediation. This would be especially
valuable for COOs at foreign subsidiaries in regions where there is weak rule of law and
high risk of conflict.
But once again, there are problems with this approach as well. First, the duties of COOs
are traditionally quite broad, adding a human rights function to the total mix is not likely to
produce effective monitoring and compliance. Second, the COO's attention is trained, tradi-
tionally, on keeping the operation "on the rails"-that is, driving revenues. The costs of in-
adequate respect for human rights may not be immediately salient to COOs since they're
concerned with the basic fundamentals of keeping the enterprise running and in the black.
Part of globalization is the presence, usually, of enhanced competition of many kinds. Such
enhanced competitive pressures may, in the short term, obscure the importance of raising
the baseline on human rights compliance, especially for COOs. Where competition and po-
litical or social disorder are high, these forces stand to drain away the organizational re-
sources that might otherwise be directed to elevating the business' human rights record.
That leaves the general counsel, the company's senior-most inside lawyer. What is the
role of the general counsel in achieving better human rights compliance by the corpora-
tion? Interestingly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 becomes relevant to the general coun-
sel's role in human rights in two ways-the first has to do with internal controls. First, the
Act puts a premium on the construction of robust and comprehensive corporate internal
them on a firm-wide level. See, e.g., Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organiza-
tions: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IowA L. REV. 697 (2002) (discussing the posi-
tive effects of the corporate compliance programs induced by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
102. See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009); see also
Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437
(2009); James A. Fanto, Recognizing the "Bad Barrel" in Public Business Firms: Social and Organiza-
tional Factors in Misconduct by Senior Decision-Makers, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2009); loan T. A. Gabel et al.,
Letter vs. Spirit: The Evolution of Compliance into Ethics, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 453 (2009).
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controls systems. These internal controls should yield superior data and reports for the se-
nior officers, boards and general counsel to review. As part of the objective of achieving
greater corporate legal accountability, the Sarbanes Oxley Act requires chief executive of-
ficers to certify the integrity-the reasonable sophistication and efficacy-of the corpora-
tion's internal controls systems.103 This is a legal expression of the advances in communica-
tions and information technology described above. As firms have become more
technologically capable of tracking their performance, they have gradually been held to a
higher standard of governing their conduct.
Most germane to this immediate discussion, Sarbanes-Oxley connects the information
gathering and reporting (internal controls) function to the "reporting up" responsibilities
of the General Counsel. That is, Section 307 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act provides that where
the general counsel becomes aware of "evidence of unlawful conduct," he or she must re-
port such information "up the ladder"-even to the board of directors if necessary to ob-
tain an adequate, remedial response. 104 So if the internal controls system yields informa-
tion about human rights problems, whether at the parent or subsidiary, it's arguable that
the general counsel must drive the evidence to the upper echelon of the corporation, and
must keep on doing so until he or she is satisfied that there will be an appropriate re-
sponse.10s
This objective, federal legal reporting duty assigned to general counsel is an enormously
promising development for advancing corporate compliance with human rights. Although
there is controversy over the standard of "evidence of unlawful conduct," there's no doubt
that a wise general counsel would not volunteer to be the firm's scapegoat by "sitting on"
plausibly unlawful conduct, including human rights abuses by employees or officers of the
firm.
Furthermore, and of crucial importance, once the general counsel has elevated the in-
formation about a potential rights problem to the senior-most corporate officers and/or
directors, the scope of their "plausible deniability" is radically curtailed. This means, as de-
scribed below, that a space opens to hold these officers and directors liable for deliberately
ignoring their duty to curtail illegality by the firm. Within the language of corporate fidu-
ciary duty, this is known as a "breach of good faith."
B. Directors' and Officers' Duty of Oversight and Corporate
Accountability for Human Rights
As discussed earlier, the 2008 Report barely addresses the conceptual underpinnings of
corporations' duty to respect human rights. Corporate fiduciary law, in tandem with ex-
panding SEC disclosure and internal controls requirements, may hold some promise in
103. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002). See also Houman B. Shadab, Innovation and Cor-
porate Governance: The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 955 (2008).
104. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 116 Stat. at 784.
105. I say it's arguable because the statute speaks of evidence of illegal conduct, which raises the question
of whether the apparent human rights problems would fit into the category of illegality. Certainly, a
wise general counsel would not volunteer to "sit on" that kind of potentially career-breaking technical
ambiguity.
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strengthening corporations' duty to respect human rights. The basic notion is captured in
the adage "with power comes responsibility." That is, corporate directors and officers in-
creasingly have the technological power to know far more about what is going on in their
company, even globally. Hence, corporate fiduciary law is expanding their duty to know,
under the duty of care and the duty of oversight. As this is happening, a byproduct is great-
er accountability on the part of the directors and officers (and general counsel) for know-
ing about and attending to elevating their corporations' human rights' records. This latter
duty, which is usually identified under the rubric of "duty of good faith," is akin to a duty to
supervise against and respond effectively to instances of illegality.
Under the duty of good faith, boards and officers have a duty to establish internal sys-
tems of information gathering and reporting, to oversee their reasonable efficacy and to
employ the information they've acquired to promote the company's legal compliance. This
obligation is referred to under a number of rubrics: again, the duty of oversight, duty of
care and a duty of good faith.106 But under each of these terminologies, a firm's directors
and officers would have an obligation to be observant about corporate human rights risks,
as part of their duty to be informed about the firm's conduct and legal compliance. It's in-
disputable that they'd have an obligation to take decisive action if they'd become cognizant
of corporate complicity in human rights violations. To have such information, and fail to act
to limit the unlawful conduct would violate their duty of good faith.
Again, the heart of the PRR framework is for companies (their officers, boards and law-
yers) to become more aware of the danger of corporate complicity in human rights abuses,
and more vigilant about avoiding them. As for fiduciary law, in the aftermath of the land-
mark 1996 decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery, In re Caremark1v-as affirmed by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Rittert1 -it is accepted that boards have a duty to
implement and oversee efficacious systems of information gathering and reporting. This
monitoring duty relates not only to the production of financial information, but the gather-
ing and synthesis of all information relevant to promoting the corporation's compliance
with the law.109 (In Caremark itself the unlawful conduct was not financial fraud but
whether the board could be held liable for failure to supervise where substantial fines and
penalties resulted from violations of health care laws and regulations.) This explicit, board-
level duty of oversight, and duty to promote legal compliance, arose belatedly in corporate
law-after the internal controls and monitoring framework had already been well estab-
lished in auditing and securities regulations.110 And though there is some ambiguity about
the scope of liability for "monitoring failures," as breaches of loyalty and good faith,111
there is no disputing that a conscious failure to act (or reckless indifference to action) in
106. For a thorough and thoughtful survey of the field and the contemporary case law, see Eric J. Pan, A
Board's Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717 (2009-2010).
107. Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
108. See Stone ex rel. Amsouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
109. See id.
110. For an excellent account of the history of the internal controls notion, prior to its acceptance into the
corporate fiduciary canon, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19
CARDOZo L. REv. 237, 244-50 (1997).
111. See Ritter, 911 A.2d at 362.
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the face of corporate illegal conduct constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
Again, the landmark fiduciary law case establishing this monitoring and "legal compliance
duty" was written only in 1996 by Chancellor Allen. Furthermore, the decision issued in
the procedurally awkward setting of an approval of a settlement of a derivative suit. In Ca-
remark, Allen provided a new reading of the "duty of care" (elsewhere therein described as
a "duty of good faith") that encompassed an ongoing duty to establish and monitor the effi-
cacy of the corporation's internal controls systems. Of course, such systems are essential to
gather, synthesize and report vital information up the ladder. Such information, the opi-
nion notes, is presumably requisite to the board's, and other senior decision makers', abili-
ty to execute their statutory duties. 112 The Caremark opinion is unflinching in endorsing
this facet of institutional design and assigning it, as a new fiduciary responsibility, to the
board and senior-most officers.
Yet, as stated above, it was only in 2006, in Stone v. Ritter, that the Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed this "Caremark 'monitoring' duty" and clarified that consistent with this
monitoring duty, directors or officers consciously possessing information about unlawful
corporate conduct, who failed to act to arrest or redress the conduct, would be culpable of
breach of loyalty (also known as breach of good faith).113 Notably, in the 2008 Report, there
are clear echoes of Chancellor Allen's language in Caremark. Allen's admonishments ring
through in the Report's emphasis on the importance of ensuring widespread distribution
of compliance programs in the firm, so as to reduce potential corporate criminal liability.114
For ten years, between 1996 and 2006, the "Caremark oversight and compliance" duty
remained controversial; but after Stone v. Ritter, there is no question that boards and se-
nior officers will be responsible for acting upon information about corporate illegality that
comes into their possession either from the General Counsel's office, or as a product of the
firm's internal reporting systems."i 5 This augurs for improved corporate response to evi-
dence of potential unlawful violations of human rights.
But Stone v. Ritter also clarified that there are important caveats to this expanded duty
of loyalty/good faith. The most germane is that the corporate conduct must be unlawful,
and not merely a reflection of poor business judgment, in order to be actionable as a
breach of the duty of good faith/loyalty. Second, for directors or officers to be legally culp-
able, they must knowingly fail to respond, or at least be recklessly indifferent in respond-
ing to, illegality which they knew about or should reasonably have known about. just these
issues have recently been tested in litigation in the Court of Chancery. In shareholder de-
rivative litigation against the board of Citibank, the court held that there could be no liabili-
ty under the duty of good faith because the corporation's investment choices, though faul-
ty, were not in any way unlawful.116 Because the shareholders could not demonstrate any
112. In Caremark this appears in the discussion of boards' duties to adopt compliance programs, consis-
tent with reducing the foreseeable scope of corporate criminal liability, consistent with the federal
sentencing guidelines. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
113. Ritter, 911 A.2d at 362.
114. SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 3, 31.
115. Ritter, 911 A.2d at 362.
116 Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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illegality in the corporation's failed investment policies and practices, their claims were
dismissed.117 This raises the question of whether boards, even boards aware of ongoing
failures in human rights compliance, could escape liability by arguing that though serious,
the abuses did not rise to the level of being unlawful, at least as far as the corporation's in-
volvement is concerned. Proving corporate complicity in unlawful violations of human
rights is, of course, no simple matter. Hence, this is one "rabbit hole" available for boards
threatened with liability under Stone's duty of good faith. One can only hope that the legal
counsel for directors in multinationals at risk of complicity in human rights violations will
not advise their clients about the least they can do and still skirt liability. After all, the court
of public opinion is extraordinarily powerful, especially for corporations that deal with
consumers and those whose investor population includes public pension funds and socially
conscious mutual funds. Directorial personal liability for breach of loyalty/good faith
would be the ultimate form of accountability under the law, but it is not the only form of
accountability and liability imposed on firms that are regarded as negligent in respecting
human rights.
The issue of directorial knowledge of unlawful conduct, as a prerequisite to a finding of
breach of good faith, has also recently been tested in a case of relevance to business and
human rights. In particular, the Delaware Court of Chancery recently dismissed a "breach
of good faith/breach of monitoring" derivative suit against the board of Dow Chemical.118
The plaintiffs alleged oversight/supervision failures in regard to bribes paid by Dow offic-
ers in conjunction with business dealings in a joint venture in Kuwait. For purposes of eva-
luating the motion, the court accepted that the bribery had occurred. However, it held that
there was insufficient evidence that directors were aware of the officers' participation in
the bribery, thus they could not be held liable for failure of supervision constituting a
breach of good faith. The Dow decision illuminates the Delaware courts' extreme reluc-
tance to hold directors personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty-that is, for any kinds
of breaches of fiduciary duty which would give rise to personal liability.
In sum, the fiduciary duty of oversight and the duty of good faith are useful as "stan-
dards of conduct." Careful outside counsel and general counsel will be motivated to en-
courage boards and officers to raise the level of corporate respect for human rights accor-
dingly. But these duties, the duty of oversight and good faith, are not overwhelmingly likely
to result in concrete sanctions against directors and officers, even if human rights viola-
tions do occur, consistent with the caveats and limitations described above.
117. Id.
118. In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010). The ruling
from Delaware Chancellor William B. Chandler III dismissed each claim, stating the plaintiffs did not
provide enough evidence to support their claims. ld. at *15. The lawsuit, filed by shareholders of The
Dow Chemical Co., alleged that board members breached their duties during the company's purchase
of Rohm and Haas Co. Id. at *1. In the lawsuit, plaintiffs Michael D. Blum and Norman R. Meier claimed
Dow's board breached its financial duties by approving the deal, misrepresented how a failed joint
venture in Kuwait would affect the purchase of Rohm and Haas and failed to prevent alleged bribery,
misrepresentation, insider trading and wasteful compensation. Id. Chandler found that the "plaintiffs
have failed to plead particularized facts sufficient to establish a substantial likelihood of liability for
any Dow director, let alone a majority of the board, on the grounds of bribery, misrepresentations, in-
sider trading, excessive or wasteful compensation or any other ground." Id at *10.
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VI. U.S. Securities Law and Human Rights Concerns
Securities law has a fundamentally different focus from corporate law, of course, and
may be ahead of corporate law in promoting corporate conscientiousness towards human
rights. Federal securities law works principally through the mechanism of mandatory dis-
closure by public corporations, which has in recent years increasingly encompassed mat-
ters of social concern, as well as obvious "bottom line" matters. The securities laws' anti-
fraud provisions threaten sanctions on firms and their agents for material
misrepresentations relevant to the firm's financial condition and performance. However,
with respect to the expanding areas of "socially relevant" disclosure, liability is not a sub-
stantial concern. Instead, the force of disclosure is felt in the market, and particularly the
market of public opinion.
The guiding principle in securities law disclosure has always been: "What information is
important to reasonable investors?" This classic definition, validated by the Supreme Court
in the landmark case of TSC Industries v. Northway, is operative throughout the securities
laws.'19 Rather than the test for materiality, its application to the scope of required disclo-
sure has remained controversial. There simply is no objective cut off or definition for what
matters reasonable investors are or should be concerned about. For many years the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission resisted inclusion of information which departed from con-
cerns directly relevant to immediate profit and loss. In recent years, however, the scope of
mandatory reporting has expanded to include a variety of subject areas relevant to the
corporation's treatment of stakeholders, as well as its handling of negative externalities, as
further elaborated below.
Furthermore, it was in no way inevitable that mandatory disclosure would hew so nar-
rowly to matters germane to short term revenues and expenses. For example, both Louis
Brandeis and Adolfe A. Berle, Jr. were concerned with the enactment of corporate and se-
curities laws that would serve the broader public interest and democratic values, as well as
the needs of investors. 120 Though Berle's landmark The Modern Corporation and Private
Property is read most commonly by academicians as a treatise on corporate agency costs,
the volume's themes are in actuality much broader.121 Indeed, Berle expresses concern
about the growing political and social influence of the increasing population of immensely
wealthy, bureaucratic, public corporations-entities, he feared, that were accountable to
no one.122 Berle enunciated his anxiety that these national and international corporations
119. TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
120. LOUis DEMBITZ BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 19 (Kelly, 1986) (1914)
("Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases."); ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 1991)
(1933).
121 For recent commentary on the landmark volume, see In Berle's Footsteps, SEATTLE UNIV. SCHOOL OF
LAw, http://www.law.seattleu.edu/CentersandInstitutes/Berle-Center/Symposium/2009.xml (last
visited June 11, 2011).
122. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 120, at vii-viii.
[A] society in which production is governed by blind economic forces is being replaced by one in
which production is carried on under the ultimate control of a handful of individuals. The economic
power in the hands of the few persons who control a giant corporation is a tremendous force which
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would wield their immense organizational and financial resources selfishly, and in time,
would accrue power equivalent or superior to states. 123 What Berle foresaw, then, was the
essential challenge posed by multinational corporations in a globalized marketplace-that
such businesses would become so wealthy and powerful that they would escape (if not
form to their selfish advantage) the bounds of law and regulation.
As described above, corporate law has not attended to this concern, and the SEC has
formerly attempted to marginalize it within the framework of mandatory disclosure and
intra-shareholder communications, at least until the mid-1970's. Since that time, albeit
very gradually, the old view of the "rational" investor as someone caring exclusively about
immediate profit and loss-and caring little or nothing about how their invested capital
affected employees, local communities, the environment or civil or human rights-has
gradually been disintegrating. As it has done so, the reporting and shareholder proposal
systems operating in public corporations (including American subsidiaries of foreign cor-
porations) has grown to encompass information relevant to whether the corporations are
"good citizens"-including information relevant to firms' human rights records.
A. Social Disclosure and the New Dodd-Frank Provisions
Over the last fifteen or so years, especially as a result of sustained and mounting pres-
sure by socially conscientious mutual funds and public pension funds, an altered dynamic
is emerging in the development of mandatory reporting for public companies under the
SEC's oversight. As a result of various commissioned studies, the scope of the subjects that
Congress and the SEC now assume falls within the interest of reasonable investors has
broadened considerably. 124 The strictures of the mandatory reporting system are being en-
larged to require additional reporting of corporations' environmental compliance, labor
standards, executive compensation rates and policies, anti-corruption efforts and anti-
discrimination policies. Shareholders have become more attuned to the fact that substan-
tial white-collar criminal penalties attach to malfeasance in many of these areas, as well as
civil fines, embarrassing enforcement actions and negative publicity campaigns. Moreover,
as large institutional investors, and especially public pension funds, play an increasingly
salient role in the securities markets, the investing public's concerns increasingly mirror
those of the broader citizenry. The costs of social and environmental degradation are costs
investors suffer as citizens.
can harm or benefit a multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of trade,
bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another. The organizations which they control have
passed far beyond the realm of private enterprises -they have become more nearly social institu-
tions.
Id. at 46.
123. Id.
124. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2006) (calling for disclosure of gap between senior-most executive compensation pay and the aver-
age worker's pay); see also Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-40018.htm ("We have gained a better understanding
of the depth of interest among shareholders in having an opportunity to express their views to com-
pany management on employment-related proposals that raise sufficiently significant policy issues.").
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The recent Dodd-Frank Legislation includes three new socially significant disclosure
mandates. 125 The first, in section 1504, requires U.S. listed, internationally active extractive
enterprises to disclose payments to foreign governments for resource rights, including the
extraction of oil, natural gas and other mineral rights. 126 The new law gives the SEC roughly
nine months to promulgate final regulations to require such resource extraction issuers
(and/or their subsidiaries or controlling companies) to make disclosure in their annual re-
ports of payments made to foreign governments (or to the federal government) for com-
mercial development of oil, natural gas or minerals. 127 In formulating the precise features
of this disclosure mandate, the SEC has been directed to take account of the guidelines,
scope and limits in the well-established, international- but merely voluntary-Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative.12 8
The operative notion is that the disclosure will benefit investors by protecting their
companies from false publicity asserting below-market, "collusive" contracts and improper
dealings with corrupt governments. Averting the costs of such false negative publicity and
reducing the danger of asset seizures upon the occurrence of regime changes is obviously
in the best interests of investors. Furthermore, the disclosures may simultaneously benefit
indigenous populations by facilitating efforts to ascertain whether corporate payments for
resources are flowing back into the seller-countries (to fund infrastructure and other civic,
capacity building projects) or are being appropriated by powerful, corrupt individuals.
In a similar vein, section 1502 of Dodd-Frank mandates SEC rulemaking to require dis-
closure by public companies (or subsidiaries or controlling entities of such companies)
whose products use "conflict" minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(or adjoining countries also subject to ongoing, violent unrest). 129 The impetus for the
SEC's rulemaking in this area is its conviction that companies whose products (or manufac-
turing methods) employ such minerals must exercise and display evidence of their heigh-
tened due diligence on the "source and chain of custody of such minerals."130 Congress has
specifically mandated that the report provide evidence of an independent private sector
audit demonstrating the company's efforts to ensure that the minerals were obtained ab-
sent corporate complicity in indigenous conflicts and violence. Under the Act, the SEC is di-
rected to promulgate rules requiring annual reports to the SEC by such firms, as well as
public reporting on the corporations' websites. 31 This provision, quite patently, represents
an effort by Congress to promote corporate human rights observance by worldwide affili-
ates of U.S. listed companies.
Finally, after several high profile (national and international) coal mining disasters in
2010, Congress has endorsed, in section 1503 of the Act, greater disclosure of mining com-
125. 124 Stat. 1376.
126. In the interests of full disclosure, I testified before the House Financial Services Committee in favor of
passage of the bill. For this testimony, see Stevelman, supra note 1, at 853-58.
127. 124 Stat. at 2220-21.
128. See Disclosure, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE,
http://eiti.org/eiti/implementation/disclosure (last visited June 16, 2011).
129. 124 Stat at 2213-18.
130 Id.
131 See id.
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panies' and their subsidiaries' health and safety records. Such data on safety is to be dis-
closed in each periodic report filed with the SEC. Congress has asked corporations to re-
port the total number of any mining-related fatalities at the enterprise, as well as more
general indicia of the company's safety record. 132
These new disclosure requirements, which went into effect on August 20, 2010, should
also vastly increase the leverage of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).
They require comprehensive disclosure of MSHA's issuance of notices of violations of
health and safety standards, imminent danger orders and the total value of financial fines
("assessments") MSHA has levied for violations. Congress made the section self-
effectuating-i.e., it does not depend on subsequent SEC rulemaking in order to become
effective. 133 In this article I take a positive view of these disclosure developments. I have
long believed that the SEC had been too heavy-handed in mandating, implicitly, that it was
"unreasonable" for investors to be concerned about the broader implications of the use of
their investment capital by corporations. Nevertheless, opposition to this view is more
than trifling. Evidencing alarm at the SEC's deviation from the older, narrow definition of
investors' "reasonable" interests, one elite corporate law firm noted in a client advisory
that the new mining disclosures are "unbounded by traditional concepts of materiality." 1 3 4
Another law firm went so far as to describe the Dodd-Frank Act's new disclosure mandates
as "an unfortunate use of the federal securities laws for purposes unrelated to securities
transactions and disclosures."135
Many corporate law firms may be sounding the alarm to their traditional clients, which
is probably astute, tactically, as a manner of garnering business. Yet it's nevertheless true
that many companies are increasingly perceiving that employee, customer and investor
morale may improve with greater corporate attentiveness to social responsibility, includ-
ing expanded transparency in this area. Consistent with this objective, the International
Standards Organization (ISO) is working to promulgate a more consistent and rigorous
body of standards which will foster improved quantification of companies' performance in
the social responsibility and human rights areas.
In sum, it's a transitional moment in the development of investors' and citizens' expecta-
tions of corporate citizenship, including human rights compliance. Transitional, to be
sure-but the trend is solidly in the direction of greater social and hence corporate atten-
tiveness.
132. ld. at 2218-20.
133. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1966).
134. See Advisory/Dodd-Frank Act: New Disclosure Rules Relating to Extractive industries, COVINGTON &
BURLEY, L.L.P., (July 22, 2010), http://www.cov.com/ (follow "Financial Regulatory Reform" hyperlink
under "Hot Topics"; then search "Advisory/Dodd-Frank Act: New Disclosure Rules Relating to Extrac-
tive Industries").
135. Id. at 4.
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B. Social Action Shareholder Proposals in the Company Proxy
In the United States, shareholder proposals to be included in the corporate proxy state-
ment are the most established, consistent channel for shareholder social activism.13 6 This
reflects and is consistent with Congress' mandate to the SEC under section 14(a) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act. Under that provision Congress empowered the Commission to con-
sider "the public interest," as well as the protection of investors in promulgating proxy
rules. 37 In its earliest incarnation, the SEC's shareholder proposal rule reflected the goal of
rendering the corporate proxy statement materially complete. If the company did not in-
clude the shareholders' proposals in its proxy statement-at least those proposals it knew
would be presented at the live, annual meeting-the rest of the shareholders would not be
informed about them (since, for most, attending the live meeting would be prohibitively
costly).s3 8 This was especially pressing because the system contemplated that the proxies
(which functionally, though not legally speaking, constituted the votes) were cast prior to
the live gathering. Accordingly, originally, the sole reason for exclusion was if the proposal
did not constitute "a proper subject for action by shareholders."13 9 Of course, circulation of
an independent proxy statement by the shareholder-proponent was prohibitively costly in
cases where control was not being sought.
Nevertheless, it was not truly until the 1970's that social action shareholder proposals
really took off. Indeed, after a famous ruling by the D.C. District Court in Medical Committee
for Human Rights v. SEC,140 in 1976, the SEC altered the shareholder proposal rule to pro-
vide, expressly, that matters which raised substantial social policy issues could not be ex-
cluded from the corporate proxy, even if they touched on some facet of "ordinary" corpo-
rate operations traditionally within the sole purview of the board.141 In these years,
Reverend Leon Sullivan used the publicity arising from his submission of shareholder pro-
posals to General Motors to persuade the company to accelerate its progress towards racial
and gender diversity in its management ranks.142 Dr. Sullivan went on, through further
proxy activism, to spur the campaign for divestment from apartheid-era South Africa.143
136. For a brief account of the legal history of corporate social responsibility within the American system
of corporate governance, see Stevelman, supra note 1, at 823-27.
137. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2006).
138. For discussion, see Securities and Exchange Commission v. Transamerica Corp., 67 F.Supp. 326
(D.C.Del. 1946).
139. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 3638, Investment Company Act Release
No. 735, 1945 WL 27415 (Jan. 3, 1945).
140. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403
(1972). For commentary on the development of shareholder proxy activism through this twenty-year
period, see Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation,
45 ALA. L. REV. 879 (1993).
141. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12999,
1976 WL 160347 (Nov. 22, 1976).
142. For commentary, see Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign
GM, 69 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1971).
143. The connection between Dr. Sullivan's obtaining a presence on GM's board and the genesis of the
"Sullivan Proposals" is described in a recent letter to the SEC from the Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility [ICCR], which has been perhaps the most active proponent of shareholder social activ-
ism through the proxy. See Letter from Paul M. Neuhauser, Board of Directors, ICCR, to the SEC (Aug.
17, 2009) (on file with author) (favoring the adoption of amendments to the SEC's rules to facilitate
140
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And social action shareholder proposals of many varieties have flourished ever since. A
quick search of the SEC's records (or the LEXIS database) reveals shareholders' proposals
dealing with firms' environmental record, safety records pertaining to workers, labor prac-
tices, political activities, charitable contributions, executive compensation policies and ap-
proach to equality and anti-discrimination efforts. Even where they have not garnered a
majority of shareholder votes, so as to become binding, these proposals have often proven
"successful" in raising awareness, publicity and thus leverage to catalyze change at large
corporations. Many times, the proponents are able, even, to drop their campaign to have
the proposal included, because the companies, proactively, voluntarily conform their con-
duct to the stated objective in the shareholder proposal. In 2006, for example, roughly one-
third of the social action proposals submitted were voluntarily withdrawn prior to the cir-
culation of the proxy statement because the shareholder advocates had reached a volunta-
ry resolution of their concerns in consultation with the company's management.144
There are an increasing number of shareholder proposals that expressly raise the issue
of business and human rights, or raise issues that are encompassed as part of the business
and human rights agenda. For example, a group called "Investors Against Genocide" has
employed the shareholder proposal process to persuade TIAA-CREF and American Funds
to commit to avoiding investment in firms that are implicated in the genocide in Darfur.145
Investors Against Genocide is presently campaigning to expand this "disinvestment" cam-
paign to virtually all of the major American mutual fund companies and major financial in-
stitutions. In this same vein, Fidelity was informed by the SEC that it could not omit a
shareholder proposal proposing a ban on investment in corporations doing business in Su-
dan. 146 Indeed, in this same vein, in 2008, several ethically motivated investor groups
agreed to drop their formal proxy proposals when Canadian mining firm Goldcorp, Inc.
agreed to conduct a study of its human rights record in Guatemala. 147
shareholder director nominations).
In 1971 the Episcopal Church introduced a shareholder proposal at General Motors requesting that
registrant to cease operations in South Africa, a nation then enforcing a very strict apartheid, in-
cluding total separation by race in the workplace (jobs, pay, drinking fountains etc). The registrant's
proxy statement revealed that one of GM's directors, the Rev. Leon Sullivan, had voted against the
Board's decision to oppose the shareholder proposal. At the annual meeting Rev. Sullivan came
down from the dais and spoke in favor of the shareholder proposal. The upshot of the 'conflict' on
GM's Board was the creation, by a coalition led by General Motors but consisting of almost all of the
major US corporations operating in South Africa, of the 'Sullivan Principles,' a code of conduct to
abolish apartheid in their South African workplaces. Thus, the need for GM's Board to adopt a mod-
us vivendi between the conflicting views on the Board brought real progress not only at GM, but at
virtually all American companies operating in South Africa.
Id. For further commentary on the shareholder proposal system as a vehicle for enhanced social
transparency and social accountability on behalf of public companies, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Se-
curities Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
144. CAROLYN MATHIASEN & HEIDI WELSH, SOCIAL POLICY SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS IN 2006: ISSUES, VOTES AND
VIEWS OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORs (2007).
145. See About Us, INVESTORS AGAINST GENOCIDE, http://investorsagainstgenocide.net/aboutus (last visited
Oct. 26, 2010).
146. Fidelity Aberdeen Street Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 223122 (jan. 22, 2008).
147. See HRIA-GUATEMALA, http://hria-guatemala.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (describing the study
completed by Goldcorp). For a brief summary of Ethical Fund's accord with Goldcorp which led to the
study, see Press Release, Ethical Funds, Ethical Funds announces support for human rights assess-
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Shareholder proposals seeking to raise corporate awareness of labor abuses occurring
along the company's supply chain have been presented to corporations including Gap, Mat-
tel, Sears, Walt Disney, McDonald's and Costco.14 8 These shareholder proposals have en-
couraged companies to adopt the core conventions of the International Labor Organization
to ensure against forced labor and child labor. In addition, through the use of shareholder
proposals, companies in the mining sector have been made to feel increased pressure to
raise their standards of safety and environmental compliance, which complements the new
Dodd-Frank disclosure standards described above.
Finally, shareholder proposals have been used to demand greater transparency and ac-
countability about corporations' political (and purportedly philanthropic) activities-
including politically motivated donations to think tanks and foundations associated with
politicians.149 Disclosure arising from traditional campaign finance and lobbying laws is de-
ficient in providing an adequately clear and comprehensive account of such corporate ac-
tivities. For this reason, activist shareholders have resorted to asking companies directly to
account for their political donations and "charitable" gifts. 50 Shareholder proposals requir-
ing disclosure of corporate political activity will be particularly important in the wake of
the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision, which expanded corporations' power to ex-
pend funds in a variety of political venues.15 1 The push for greater transparency in regard
to businesses' lobbying and campaign finance expenditures is part of the broader concern
for advancing the rule of law and democratic values-both being essential facets of the
human rights agenda.
ment of Goldcorp's Marlin Mine (May 17, 2010),
https://www.ethicalfunds.com/en/Investor/OurStory/InTheNews/EthicalFundsintheNews/Pages/1
7052010e.aspx
148. See, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 2587881 (Oct. 26, 2004); The Gap
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 562183 (Mar. 13, 2002). For citation and discussion, see Adam
Kanzer, The Use of Shareholder Proposals to Address Corporate Human Rights Performance, in FINANCE
FOR A BETTER WORLD 71 (Henri-Claude de Bettignies & Frangois L6pineux eds., 2009).
149. Such shareholder proposals can be excluded from the corporate proxy for a variety or reasons, in-
cluding, inter alia: (i) where they are deemed not to be a subject for shareholder but rather for board
decision-making; (ii) where they are vague; and (iii) where they reflect a "personal grievance" on the
part of the proponent. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010). See also Pacific Gas &
Electric Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 128062 (Mar. 10, 2010) (allowing company to exclude
proposal requesting semi-annual report of company's charitable contributions and policies governing
them on basis that request was "substantially implemented" by the company); Halliburton Co., SEC
No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 5149217 (jan. 21, 2010) (concluding that company had no proper basis to
exclude request for disclosure of company's political contributions); Caremark Rx, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2005 WL 562506 (refusing to concur with the corporations reasons for excluding request for
report on company's charitable contributions).
150. For a discussion of the disclosure void relevant to politically motivated corporate "philanthropic" do-
nations to politically active foundations, think tanks and litigation boutiques, see Faith Stevelman
Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 579 (1997); Nancy Knauer, Reinventing Government: The Promise of Institutional Choice and Gov-
ernment Created Charitable Organizations, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 945, 983 (1997). On the use of see-
mingly philanthropic "conduits" to mask corporate political activities, see id.
151. Citizens United v. FEC, --- U.S. --- , 130 S. Ct 876 (2010).
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C. The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
Bribery and other forms of corruption involving corporations and foreign governments
are obviously subversive of human rights. Consistent with this concern, the United King-
dom recently enacted the toughest modern anti-corporate bribery laws extantl52-laws
that are far more stringent than the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.1s3
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was enacted in 1977 after a series of scandals
uncovered that American companies had been paying bribes to foreign governments to
win contracts.154 The FCPA was enacted as part of the Securities Act of 1934, along with
more stringent books and record-keeping provisions for public companies.1s5 The nexus
was that companies making bribes and other unlawful payments were also creating slush
funds and other false records, inconsistent with the securities laws' disclosure require-
ments. This is an early example of how disclosure requirements of significance to investors
were also intended expressly to influence substantive corporate conduct in the direction of
greater honesty and integrity.
Over the past five years, there has also been an intensification in the number and se-
riousness of FCPA enforcement actions brought by the SEC in civil cases, and by the De-
partment of Justice for alleged criminal violations. Indeed, FCPA enforcement in the past
five years has set several new records.156 For example, in April 2010, the DOJ announced
that the German automobile manufacturer Daimler, A.G. agreed to pay $185 million in
criminal and civil penalties in settlement of FCPA charges.s 7 Also in April 2010, a Virginia
federal court meted out a seven year jail sentence to an American, acting on behalf of a
consulting company, who paid bribes to the Panamanian government for purposes of ob-
taining a twenty-year no-bid contract. 5 8 This enhanced scrutiny and enforcement is moti-
152. On April 8, 2010, the U.K. Parliament passed significant and long-pending legislation reforming Brit-
ain's laws on criminalizing corrupt payments to government officials. Initially expected to come into
full force April 2010, but delayed until July 2011,, the Bribery Act of 2010 replaces fragmented and
difficult-to-prosecute, common law bribery offenses and statutory offenses that date back to the early
1900's. The reform coincides with significantly increased enforcement efforts by the U.K. Serious
Fraud Office and responds to international criticisms that U.K. legislation lagged behind OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention implementation legislation and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. For an
overview of the new U.K. law, see Gary DiBianco & Penny Madden, U.K. Parliament Enacts Landmark
Anti-Bribery Law, SKADDEN, ARPs, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, L.L.P. & AssocIATEs (Apr. 15, 2010),
http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentlD=51&itemlD=2045.
153. Prohibited Foreign Trade Practices by Issuers, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1998).
154. For a landmark case (decided after the enactment of the FCPA) which allowed a special litigation
committee to quash a shareholder derivative suit against a board of directors and senior officers
where the company had engaged in pattern of making unlawful payments to foreign governments,
prior to the enactment of the FCPA, see Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2002) (prior to 2010 amendment).
156. See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of justice, Prepared Address to the 22nd Na-
tional Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in Wash. D.C. (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov./criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/11-17-09aagbreuer-remarks-
fcpa.pdf.
157. As part of the settlement, former FBI Director Louis Freeh will serve as the company's independent
compliance monitor for three years. Richard L. Cassin, Freeh Named Daimler Monitor, FCPA BLOG
(Mar. 25, 2010, 11:48 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/3/25/freeh-named-daimler-
monitor.html.
158. The official announcement of the verdict and findings is presented by the DOJ. Press Release, Dep't of
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vated by anti-corruption and anti-money laundering objectives, and also by provisions of
the USA PATRIOT Act, which targets eradicating the flow of funds to governments possibly
supporting terrorist organizations.159 The stepped-up anti-bribery legislation enacted by
the United Kingdom was mentioned above, but this renewed commitment to expanding an-
ti-corruption laws and enforcement efforts is evidenced in many acts of the European Un-
ion, United Nations and international treaties as well. 160 Here in the United States, too,
there are ongoing initiatives dedicated to raising the level of corporate compliance with the
FCPA. In sum, there is a broad and deep consensus that a strong stance against business
corruption is essential to building a law-abiding, human rights-respecting global order.
VII. Conclusion
There are powerful reasons to be skeptical, if not cynical, about efforts to raise the level
of business compliance with human rights-that is, efforts to use law, policy and public
pressure to transform corporate cultures to rights-respecting ones, rather than rights-
exploiting ones. There is no embarrassment in expecting the worst and being proven cor-
rect, or being passive in the face of complex problems. Business' efforts to promote respect
for human rights may be lambasted as public relations, or as ineffectual, or "inefficient."
Governments' efforts may be criticized on the same basis. However, when pressure mounts
to hold businesses that profit from global operations to account for their treatment of vul-
nerable populations and scarce natural resources mounts at several fronts-
simultaneously and with increasing force-from governments and business leaders them-
selves, from groups representing employees and investors, concerned citizens and stu-
dents-attention must be paid.
Change happens-momentous, transformational, unlikely socio-legal change. Examples
include the end of segregation in the United States, the advance of women's rights, the end
of Apartheid in South Africa, and the fall of the Berlin Wall. None of these changes seemed
Justice, Virginia Resident Sentenced to 87 Months in Prison for Bribing Foreign Government Officials
(Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-crm-442.html.
159. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Ob-
struct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
160. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg-no=XVlll-
14&chapter=18&lang=en.; European Union Convention on the Protection of European Communities'
Financial Interests, 1995 0.1. (C 316) 49, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:41995A1127(03):EN:HTML; Organization of
American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996);
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
eign Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf; African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 (2004). Policies instituted by the World Bank and the
IMF allow for the investigation of corruption committed by companies and governments. See, e.g.,
WBI Governance & Anti-Corruption, THE WORLD BANK, www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance (last vi-
sited Feb. 2011); FactSheet: The IMF and Good Governance, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gov.htm (last visited Feb. 2011). For commentary and
statistics, see Recent Trends and Patterns of FCPA Enforcement, SHEARMAN & STERLING, L.L.P. (Feb. 13,
2008), http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/LT-021308-Recent-Trends-and-Patterns-in-FCPA-
Enforcement-February-2008.pdf.
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inevitable. Nor were their causes singular. On account of the technological innovations that
have enabled information gathering and real time reporting on the Web, human rights
harms by businesses will not remain invisible. And in a condition of visibility, the voices
calling for greater respect on the part of business for human rights will be many.
The Human Rights Council has done well in authorizing John Ruggie to sponsor several
years of international consultations with leaders in government, business and the human
rights community. If they follow the "Protect, Respect, Remedy" framework with serious-
ness of purpose, businesses may be able to get out in front of the tumultuous change their
human rights abuses and disregard for "externalities" might otherwise spur. Then, instead
of violent confrontations and anti-business regulation, we might see gradual, international
progress towards a more humane and also more prosperous world where business and
human rights concerns were not always viewed as being at odds.
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